Page 117 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

102 Chapter 5

mounting evidence of fraud invalidate the elections?” The commission answered eva-
sively, leaving the question hanging. Whatever the official reply might have been,
there were no other news outlets present to report it.
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Explaining the Coverage
In the KPU’s final tally, released in late July, PDIP won the elections with 33.74

percent of the popular vote, a surprising plurality in a forty-eight-party contest, caus-
ing jubilation among supporters and a general sense among observers that the elec-
tions were a success. In what seemed a reversal of fortunes, Golkar received 22.44
percent. Yet while conceding to PDIP, Golkar had successfully secured a solid posi-
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tion to form a government through coalition building.
Golkar’s subtle subversion of the electoral process to reach this end, aided by a
disproportionate allocation of seats favoring the outer islands during the rule writing,
went virtually unreported. Most coverage, both Indonesian and foreign, reiterated the
message that the elections had been free and fair and the ruling party’s infractions
were neither serious nor systematic enough to be significant.
There were exceptions to this reassurance, particularly among the Jakarta-based
newsweeklies, whose election coverage included several investigative reports. The
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most hard-hitting was an exposé published in the June 21–27 issue of Tempo , accusing
Arnold Baramuli, chair of President Habibie’s Supreme Advisory Council and Golkar
party boss, of practicing “money politics” in North Sulawesi to swing the election in
Golkar’s favor. The next week, Tempo published a ten-page investigation on electoral
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fraud nationwide. The two reports cited evidence that Baramuli had funneled Golkar
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funds to religious organizations in North Sulawesi to influence the vote, and further
implicated his company, Poleko, in two separate scandals.
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Though damning, these reports attracted almost no follow-up and failed to garner
attention that might have checked the cheating. More media focus on irregularities
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might have induced the KPU to intervene in the outer-island provinces where Golkar
was getting its strongest majorities. Had the KPU declined, public pressure might
have forced the issue, imposing greater accountability on the commissioners. Without
this pressure, they were free to turn a blind eye.
Also missing from most reporting was the relentless horse-race coverage all but
inescapable in Western elections. Such coverage, though easily criticized for its reduc-
tive tendencies, would nonetheless have drawn attention—through daily or hourly
coverage—to the shrinking gap between the top parties toward the end of the race.
In Indonesia’s first post-Suharto elections, discussion of the closing gap was mini-
mal, and even the major opposition parties appeared to accept Golkar’s gains with
equanimity.
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How can we account for this seeming complacency? Fundamentally, there was
relief that the elections had gone forward with almost no violence. Pragmatically,
there was also a general understanding that Indonesia lacked the resources and the
political will to invalidate the results and oversee a second vote. Though the elections
were compromised, a consensus formed that the level of fraud was acceptable. Finally,
as later reports revealed, the major opposition parties, numerous religious organi-
zations, and much of the media were being bribed for their discretion with funds
from the swelling coffers of the state rice monopoly, Badan Urusan Logistik (the State
Logistics Agency), known as Bulog.
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