Page 143 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

128 Chapter 7

Buloggate II
Wahid’s moves to rein in the media were a natural response to his fear of los-
ing public support that ironically cost him the very allies he needed to fend off
impeachment. They were also a precursor to his eventual declaration of the state
of emergency that precipitated his fall. But events might well have gone the other
way, returning the country to autocratic rule. His successor, Megawati Sukarnopu-
tri, was more cautious, though both her administration and the political parties
that put her in power were, from the outset, even more uncomfortable with the
country’s noisy, meddlesome, and “irresponsible” media. Yet even as news outlets
navigated this continued hostility, they were becoming a primary, if not the primary,
mediator of the intraelite confl ict that was now a defi ning feature of the country’s
politics.
As Megawati began her term in July 2001, Golkar’s second-place strategy in the
1999 elections appeared to have paid off. Under Wahid, the former ruling party had
seemed almost impervious to the corruption charges leveled against it by rival parties
and civil society groups. After Wahid’s fall, Golkar had sufficient seats to continue
obstructing democratic reform and evade accountability for its 1999 electoral fraud. But
this influence began to fray when charges over Golkar’s use of Bulog funds suddenly
resurfaced in October, putting Golkar on the defensive and transforming Mahfud’s
press leak of the previous February into a full-blown scandal. Though this second
Buloggate did little to slow Wahid’s steady slide toward impeachment, it nonetheless
changed the course of Indonesia’s transition.
While the rest of parliament had ignored the PKB’s demands to investigate Gol-
kar’s chair, Tanjung, for misuse of Bulog funds, Wahid had not. Just before he fell,
he had his attorney general open a probe and declare former Bulog chief Rahardi
Ramelan an official suspect. Ramelan left the country, and Megawati’s new govern-
ment did nothing, reportedly observing an agreement with leaders of several factions
“to avoid cross-party political aggression.”
58
A flaw in this agreement was its failure to include other key players set on oust-
ing Tanjung from his Golkar leadership. These included Wahid’s party, PKB, which
was “determined,” said journalist John McBeth, “to exact revenge for Tanjung’s role
in ousting Wahid in August.” Legislators representing the provinces of Irian Jaya,
59
Maluku, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan reportedly also began plotting to rid the party of
Tanjung in early October. Most critically, as it turned out, leaders of the Indonesian
60
Association of Muslim Intellectuals, a think tank founded by the former president
Habibie, “recruited” Ramelan to their own mission to rid Golkar of Tanjung, convinc-
ing him to return to Indonesia for questioning.
61
Ramelan’s return revived the government’s investigation. On October 9, during
an interview at the attorney general’s office, he “spilled the beans,” announcing that
in March 1999 he had given Rp40 billion from Bulog’s nonbudgetary funds directly to
Tanjung. During questioning, Ramelan explained that President Habibie and certain
62
members of his cabinet had allocated the money for use, under Tanjung’s supervision,
as aid to people hurt by the economic crisis. To make sure the revelation reached the
63
public, Ramelan repeated his explanation to reporters.
This revelation became the moment when the long-observed code of silence
in Golkar’s ranks cracked. Even so, the state prosecutor’s office, now controlled by
Megawati, did not act. But the revelation received wide media coverage, stirring the
public, particularly students, to turn on Tanjung. Then, on October 23, fifty legislators