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Scandal and Democratic Consolidation 125

nonbudgetary funds to finance its 1999 election campaign. Less than two weeks
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later, the PKB faction demanded a special DPR investigation into “Golkargate.”
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Although these latest allegations seemed to promise a “Buloggate II,” none of
the accusations against Tanjung and his party produced official investigations. Nor
did they take the heat off the president. Not long after Buloggate I broke, Wahid suf-
fered another blow from revelations that he had accepted a $2 million donation from
the sultan of Brunei, Hassanal Bolkiah. This new scandal quickly became “Brunei-
gate.” Though he denied any wrongdoing in the Bulog case, Wahid did admit to taking
money from Brunei but claimed to have donated it all to humanitarian causes.
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On August 28, 2000, a coalition of 237 legislators from six parties voted to estab-
lish a parliamentary committee to investigate the president’s role in the two scandals,
Buloggate and Bruneigate. On October 28, police officially cleared the president of
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wrongdoing related to Bulog. But three months later, the investigating committee
reported that Wahid had knowingly “avoided legal procedures” to raise funds for
Indonesia’s war-torn provinces, using Bulog funds and the sultan of Brunei’s $2 mil-
lion gift.
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Wahid refused to recognize the legality of the committee, viewing its probes as a
ploy to push him from power. On February 1, 2001, the Golkar-dominated DPR passed
a resolution to censure the new president. The following month, Wahid had his minister
of justice read a fifteen-page speech to the DPR apologizing for “any possible unpleas-
ant or unacceptable behaviour.” Yet the president maintained his innocence, calling the
charges against him “baseless” and challenging the legitimacy of the investigations.
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Wahid’s Turn against the Media
Throughout his two-year term, Wahid maintained an ambiguous relationship
with the media that grew steadily worse in the period preceding his downfall. On
National Press Day in February 2000, only months after taking offi ce, the president
gave journalists what Kompas called “a special present” in the form of a lengthy cri-
tique. He complained about both Indonesian and foreign reporting on East Timor
and Aceh. But his main reproach was that domestic media reports magnifi ed confl icts
between him and other national leaders, particularly General Wiranto and Vice Presi-
dent Megawati. At the same time, he emphasized that his critique came out of a deep
sense of camaraderie with the media, claiming to have long been a wartawan tanpa
surat kabar , or a “journalist without a newspaper.”
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In mid-April, Wahid’s defense minister, Juwono Sudarsono, lambasted Indone-
sia’s private television stations for inflaming provincial conflicts. He acknowledged
the necessity of press freedom in a democracy but suggested that the cost was becom-
ing too great. Comments on talk shows “have worsened . . . social conflicts,” he said.
“Politicians’ rhetoric has incited their own supporters to attack each other.”
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When the Indonesian media began pursuing Buloggate I, turning the story of
Wahid’s scheming masseur into a serial drama, Wahid’s defenders began to see a
darker agenda behind their coverage. In October 2000, the deputy secretary general of
Wahid’s party, Chotibul Umam Wiranu, accused the press of cooperating with “politi-
cal forces . . . inside and outside the legislature” to overthrow his government. In a
speech on October 6 before the Muslim association, Nahdlatul Ulama, he announced
that “60 percent” of the nation’s publications were part of this “print media con-
spiracy.” He added, “In the near future, two electronic media will appear to join the
anti-government strength.”
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