Page 137 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

122 Chapter 7

and the skewed distribution of parliamentary seats, the former ruling party controlled
a quarter of the DPR—more than double the seats won by the new president’s own
National Awakening Party (PKB). With thirty regional branches, moreover, Golkar’s
reach extended far beyond any other party. Most importantly, the powerful post of
DPR Speaker now belonged to its chair, Akbar Tanjung.
Ironically, as head of the legislature, Tanjung also controlled access to the Price-
waterhouseCoopers (PwC) audit that investigated Habibie’s and Golkar’s role in the
Bank Bali scandal. A summary of the audit had been released, but the more revealing
full report, documenting the transfer of Rp15 billion to the Golkar Election Commit-
tee, was being held back. Though Tanjung was not implicated directly by the audit,
1
he was still Golkar’s chair and a key fundraiser, which gave him cause to avoid releas-
ing the full report. On October 19, 1999, the day before the presidential election, the
Supreme Court ordered that the document be handed over to parliament. But the
court’s decision did not mention any public right to access. In the following weeks,
Tanjung was still refusing to disclose the full report—even to the joint DPR commit-
tee charged with investigating the affair.
2
It was at this point that the executive turnover that brought a new party to power
proved significant in Indonesia’s democratic transition. It seems likely that, had Gol-
kar maintained control of the presidency, the full PwC audit would have remained
locked away, safe in the hands of the same party implicated by its findings. A Wahid
presidency, however, led not by Golkar but by his PKB, shattered the decades-long
partnership between the executive and legislature that allowed those in power to sup-
press damaging information.
Upon assuming office, Wahid began pushing for the release of the full PwC report.
The IMF added to this pressure by continuing to withhold $4.7 billion in loans pend-
ing disclosure of the full four-hundred-page audit. Members of the media, the public,
3
and leaders of rival parties joined this chorus. In November 1999, Tanjung finally gave
in, only weeks before the parliament’s deadline for the Bank Bali committee to com-
plete its investigation.
Subsequent legal proceedings, however, proved disappointing. Attempts to pros-
ecute the principals led to acquittals or outright dismissals. After a year of investiga-
tion, the government failed to produce a single conviction in one of the most carefully
documented scandals in the republic’s history. While Baligate had been key in derail-
ing Golkar’s campaign to retain the executive, the judicial process responsible for its
prosecution remained hostage to political manipulation.
Nonetheless, the Wahid government’s initial demand for the PwC report’s
release was promising for the transition. Upon taking office, the new president told
journalists to be tough on his administration, affirming his commitment to press
freedom and democratic reform. In November, Wahid went further, dissolving the
4
once-feared Ministry of Information that had controlled the media for four decades.
In mid-February 2000, Wahid skillfully pushed the former Indonesian National Army
commander, General Wiranto, out of his cabinet, winning commendation from reform
factions and political observers. Fikri Jufri of Tempo said the president was moving
like “a knight in chess” and praised him for being “consistent in his inconsistency.”
5
Likewise, the Jakarta Post said, “Indonesians would do best to get used to [Wahid’s]
peculiar style of leadership,” and called Wiranto’s peaceful removal “a great achieve-
ment and a giant step in the right direction for the country.”
6
Overall, Wahid’s reform agenda, though widely applauded, did not go far enough
for some and went too far for others. Thus his honeymoon with the media and the