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Scandal and Democratic Consolidation 129

from five factions submitted a petition to the DPR leadership demanding a parliamen-
tary probe into the affair, proposing formation of “Special Committee Buloggate II.”
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Golkar’s leaders had already acted to counter such a move, demonstrating the
power they still wielded. Tanjung’s first response to Ramelan’s disclosure was to
admit the transaction but deny any impropriety. He insisted that he had not diverted
any funds to Golkar’s election coffers, but had channeled them directly to a charity for
food distribution under the government’s Social Safety Net program. Next, the Gol-
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kar legislator Ferry Mursyidan Baldan spoke out, warning those contemplating a DPR
investigation: “Don’t push Akbar to play his trump card, it would affect many people,
including the current government.” Tanjung then approached Megawati’s husband,
Taufik Kiemas—who was himself vulnerable to Tanjung’s “trump card” threat—to
pressure Kiemas to help block the special investigation.
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Megawati was in a difficult position even without Tanjung’s threat to her hus-
band. She had already alienated her one-time ally, PKB, by backing Wahid’s impeach-
ment. Her administration relied on a fragile coalition with former enemies in Golkar
and the same Muslim parties who had stridently opposed her candidacy back in 1999.
Her own vice president, Hamzah Haz—leader of the largest Muslim party, the United
Development Party—was now a vocal detractor and among those most eager to see
her government fall. As one insider explained, “The hardline Muslim parties are now
backing the investigation into [Tanjung] because they feel it will weaken Megawati’s
powerbase and make her easier to overthrow.”
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Yet PDIP could not ignore mounting public pressure, led by student groups
demanding Tanjung’s punishment, for action on this latest Bulog fraud. On October
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16, 2000, the coalition of four civil society organizations that had filed suit against
Golkar in June met with officials at the attorney general’s office to demand a formal
inquiry into Ramelan’s allegations. Tanjung responded by daring them to continue
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their pursuit, claiming that there was no evidence of his “misappropriating” Bulog
funds.
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The state’s poor record in prosecuting high-profile corruption cases helped
explain Tanjung’s confidence. In case after case, including the famous Bank Bali trials,
defendants had received acquittals after prosecutors filed flimsy cases and neglected
to present evidence that had already been gathered. Though the causes of this dys-
function were widely known, the media nevertheless leaked an external audit reveal-
ing that the attorney general’s office was riddled with institutionalized corruption.
Influenced by bribes or political pressure, prosecutors routinely distorted due process,
most frequently by filing weak charges or burying evidence.
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At this sensitive juncture, the news media became a remedy for the problem this
leaked report exposed, doing the job state prosecutors would not. As it turned out,
the critical evidence that moved the case would come the following October from an
exposé by the once-banned magazine Tempo . In its cover story of October 29, 2001,
Tempo reported “the involvement of senior Golkar officials” in the diversion of Bulog
funds—officials who were “apparently working hard to cover their tracks.” Effectively
foiling this cover-up, the magazine dissected Tanjung’s story of forwarding Bulog
funds to an unnamed foundation. According to this investigation, a Golkar insider
had learned from Tanjung’s lawyers that a “foundation that could be used as ‘camou-
flage’ had been found” with links to Golkar’s deputy treasurer. The source added that
Tanjung’s lawyer had then “boasted that he had successfully lobbied senior officials
of the ‘Round Building’ [the attorney general’s office] to go along with this plot.” The
conspirators had finally settled on a third scheme that hinged on the assumption that