Page 85 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

70 Chapter 4

reduced to filling out a form. Another new regulation allowed multiple journalists’
18
associations, freeing the press from the wadah tunggal system that had given so much
power to the PWI. Finally, new rules on broadcasting reduced the number of govern-
19
ment news bulletins that radio stations had to relay from thirteen to three a day and
freed radio and television broadcasters to produce their own hard news.
20
Many felt these measures did not go far enough. Leo Batubara from the Associa-
tion of Newspaper Publishers complained of the media’s continued susceptibility to
executive manipulation, particularly via the courts. Legal expert Robinson Hamo-
21
nangan Siregar argued that, despite the reforms, media were just as constrained as
they had been under Suharto because the notorious “hate-sowing articles” of the
criminal code remained in effect. Siregar also took issue with the government’s con-
tinued right to “freeze” press licenses.
22
Like most media representatives, the reformist Alliance of Independent Journal-
ists (AJI) welcomed the changes, but also characterized the ministry’s efforts as “half-
hearted,” offering three main criticisms: First, despite reforms, the continuation of the
SIUPP system left the government with too much power over the print press. Second,
though journalists could now choose any affiliation, the stipulation that they must
belong to at least one journalists’ association violated their freedom of association
and organization. And third, though less onerous, the requirement that broadcasters
must still relay government-produced news “constituted a violation of the principles
of media freedom and pluralism.”
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Impact of the First Reforms
Even these limited reforms, however, had an immediate impact. Within fi ve
months, the Ministry of Information had issued 333 new publishing licenses, more
than doubling the total allocated during Suharto’s entire reign. By the end of 1999,
the number of new licenses reached well over a thousand—transforming coverage, as
shown in the appendixes below. Opposition political parties ran at least four of the
tabloids, fl outing decades of New Order–cultivated antipathy toward partisan journal-
ism. On the streets, newsstands were soon overfl owing with low-budget tabloids
24
and glossy newsmagazines, and hawkers struggled to display long armfuls for cus-
tomers in passing cars. The arresting headlines and graphics in these curbside arrays
promised the reporting on corruption and elite confl icts that now typified media fare.

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Established publications accustomed to burying controversy deep within articles
now splashed provocative quotes from shunned opposition figures, including labor
activist Muchtar Pakpahan and East Timor rebel leader Xanana Gusmão, across front
pages. Even more dramatic was the frenzy triggered by reports on the once untouch-
able subject of Suharto’s wealth, as the print media scrambled to top one another in
revelations about the family’s vast accumulation of property and possessions. Callers
on talk radio vented outrage at unfolding details. Street hawkers added to the spec-
tacle by selling xeroxed lists of Suharto family assets accompanied by matching mug
shots.
The media also began airing exposés on the abuses of power that had built the
Suharto family empire. The Jakarta Post reported that at least 120 businesses holding
contracts with the state oil company, Pertamina, were owned by Suharto’s children
or friends. The paper further revealed that city council members were now impos-
ing $1.86 million in fines for building permit violations on a Suharto family hotel,
and police were reviewing contracts for processing driver’s licenses controlled by