Page 88 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

Reformasi 73

limits of tolerance, potentially striking at the core of power. The latter is particularly
important for its ability to provoke confrontations with the state, prompting offi-
cials to draw one of those lines in the sand. In Indonesia, such confrontations were
necessary to construct a legal framework defining speech that deserves legal pro-
tection from state agencies, enabling news outlets to predict, with some degree of
certainty, the consequences of airing provocative content. Over the long term, such
certainty could empower the media to defend territory already gained and rights
already asserted.
News exposing malfeasance or incompetence and forcing political figures onto
the defensive further increased transparency and accountability during Indonesia’s
democratic transition. In addition, stories that produced “scandal” helped shake up
the political process, shift the balance of power, and inject new uncertainty into elec-
toral and other contests—all of which helped counteract trends toward stagnation and
reversal.
Some news outlets pushed harder than others in pursuing such coverage, testing
the boundaries of their new freedom with full-blown exposés, almost daring officials
to react. Significantly, Tempo ’s inaugural post-ban cover story revealed military involve-
ment in the rapes of ethnic Chinese women during the May 1998 riots, arguably the
most sensitive controversy of the day. Dë TAK was equally aggressive. In November
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1998, a point of maximum tension between the military and students, Dë TAK pub-
lished a hard-hitting exposé on military involvement in a mysterious murder spree by
killers dressed like Japanese ninjas throughout East Java.
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The serial murders had already fueled widespread speculation about possible
conspiracies. Military and police officials claimed that descendants of the Indo-
nesian Communist Party cadres killed in 1965–66 were exacting revenge for the
participation in that purge of the Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). NU
representatives insisted that the killings were part of a scheme to pit the largest
Muslim associations against each other, weakening their base before the national
elections. Significantly, one spate of killings coincided with NU’s efforts to form a
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new political party headed by its leader, Abdurrahman Wahid, who accused Presi-
dent Habibie’s cabinet of involvement. Others speculated that elements of the
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armed forces were engineering the attacks to justify the military’s continued role
in politics.
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The Indonesian media reported such accusations, and a few outlets highlighted
evidence of military involvement, though this was largely circumstantial. In its
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November exposé, however, Dë TAK went further. At the heart of its detailed report

was an eyewitness description by a deserter from a military-connected camp train-
ing agents provocateurs, including the ninja murderers, to create political instability.
Significantly, the report linked the operations to Kopassus, an elite unit once com-
manded by Suharto’s son-in-law, damaging the military’s credibility as defender of
public order. Dë TAK also traced control over these units to Jalan Cendana, the Suharto
clan’s street in central Jakarta, reporting that the “Cendana” family was using these
campaigns to divert attention from reformasi initiatives, including the investigation of
Suharto’s wealth.
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The exposé also connected the East Java murders and May’s military orches-
tration of anti-Chinese violence reported by Tempo , citing the deserter’s claims that
Kopassus soldiers were dispatched “to set fire to stores” to incite violence, and that
each recruit was given resources to enlist the aid of five to ten civilian rioters. Con-
firming earlier, more speculative reports in other publications, the deserter stated that