Page 89 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

74 Chapter 4

the ninja murders aimed to disrupt the congress in Bali being held by the opposition
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan,
PDIP).
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Although the Suharto clan’s suspected role in the ninja murders had been the sub-
ject of countless rumors, Dë TAK’s insider testimony on the operations of the Kopassus
deserters, a group the military denied even existed, was indeed news. Not only did
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the exposé confirm earlier reports on these deserters and detail the infrastructure of
their training camps and command. It also revealed the Suharto family’s continued
capacity for psychological warfare and political destabilization.
The timing of the Dë TAK report was significant, hitting the streets just before
the November parliamentary session, when barbed wire barricades began reappear-
ing in Jakarta and students prepared to square off against security forces. The report
strengthened their case in protesting the military’s continued hold on dedicated par-
liamentary seats; it also justified efforts to contain the young men of the Pam Swa-
karsa (Voluntary Security Units), who were being bussed in and armed with spears
and sharp sticks ostensibly to help with security, but who became a force for inciting
violence. Simultaneously, a joint fact-finding team, composed of members of the
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government and nongovernmental organizations, released a report implicating the
military in the destruction and sexual violence against ethnic Chinese during the May
1998 riots, affirming Tempo ’s earlier findings.
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The impact of these reports on the transition is difficult to measure. But the
most serious threats to democratization in the first year included high-level efforts to
foment intergroup conflict. Violence fueled by the military was used to justify states
of emergency and suspension of civil liberties in specific regions, such as Maluku
following the outbreak of interreligious violence in 1999. News coverage reinforc-
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ing the impression of a breakdown in order legitimated such measures. Conversely,
reports on military instigation of violence justified restraint in authorizing a military
crackdown to restore order.
These reports also tested government tolerance for the media’s new freedom by
challenging the military’s privileged position. Yet they did not prompt a backlash.
This nonresponse seemed to affirm acceptance by officials, including the military, of
the media’s critical stance. Alternatively, it demonstrated only a suspension of author-
itarian controls. In either case, the lack of repercussions may have emboldened col-
leagues, while the reports’ success created a market incentive for rival publications to
push the boundaries of free speech even further.

Black Friday
At the time of the Dë TAK report’s release, journalists met a different kind of back-

lash in covering a scheduled November special session of parliament. Initial planning
for the session provoked vehement student opposition to the slate of Suharto-era
legislators who would, by default, set the rules for the democratic transition. As the
government forged ahead, demonstrators again fl ooded the streets outside parliament
chanting, in solidarity with journalists, “Banning is banned!” News outlets once again
provided prominent coverage.
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The media’s use of their new freedom manifest in this coverage, whether inten-
tionally or inadvertently, helped defend the transition from reversal in three important
ways: magnifying objections to legislative biases in setting the rules for the transi-
tion; asserting the media’s right to report civil unrest; and sustaining pressure on