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true [ ed. note: this is required at the summary that “[b]ased on the record, a reasonable jury
judgment stage] and review it through the lens of could conclude that it was more likely than not
qualified immunity. that Samples’s head injury happened when he fell
to the ground after being hit [] by a taser.” As a
Our legal inquiry into the availability of qualified procedural matter, we’re then barred from
immunity fits into a two-step framework. First, gainsaying this determination and must accept that
taking the facts in the plaintiff-friendly light that
there is indeed a genuine factual dispute about
we must, we need to determine whether causation. But even if we were free to do so, we
Vadzemnieks violated a constitutional right.
would have little hesitation in coming to the same
Second, we must ask whether Vadzemnieks’s conclusion. It is undisputed that Samples’s skull
actions violated clearly established rights “of was cracked, suggesting a heavy fall; it is
which a reasonable person would have known.”
undisputed that Samples fell backwards, head
towards the center of the street, after being tased;
We begin with the question of constitutional harm.
it is undisputed that when EMS arrived, Samples
To state an excessive force claim under the Fourth
was lying face-down in the street, with fresh
Amendment, a plaintiff “must show ‘(1) injury, (2)
abrasions along the side of his face. While the
which resulted directly and only from a use of
officers may not have seen—or could not recall
force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the
seeing—Samples suffer a head injury, they both
excessiveness of which was clearly
saw him fall backwards. It is eminently reasonable
unreasonable.’”
to infer that when someone goes limp and falls
Vadzemnieks does not dispute that Samples’s backwards, a head eventually hits the ground.
subdural hematoma is a sufficient injury to ground
Vadzemnieks argues that his decision to tase
a claim of excessive force, for under our
Samples was neither “excessive” nor “clearly
prevailing caselaw it is. Instead, Vadzemnieks
unreasonable.” The Supreme Court has explained
takes aim at the second and third elements of
that inquiry into whether a particular use of force
Samples’s excessive force claim: causation and
was reasonable “must be judged from the
excessiveness.
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,”
Vadzemnieks argues that no facts in the record and the “calculus of reasonableness must embody
could support a jury’s conclusion that the decision allowance for the fact that police officers are often
to tase Samples caused the brain injury. According forced to make split-second judgments.” Courts
to Vadzemnieks, this is so because “[t]he story [of customarily consider three factors in making this
how Samples came to be out on the street] will inquiry: “the severity of the crime at issue,
remain untold” due to his memory loss, and that whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to
means there is an insoluble possibility that the safety of the officers or others, and whether he
Samples actually suffered the brain injury at some is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
point before the officers arrived on the scene. arrest by flight.” [ed. note: reports should include
Vadzemnieks also argues that no evidence specific facts relating to these factors.]
contradicts the statements made by him and
Because of the constraints of interlocutory review,
McGregor—and neither of the officers
we must assume that Samples was “clearly
“recall[ed]” or “saw” a direct head injury to
unarmed,” “not attempting to flee,” not
Vadzemnieks.
“combative,” and, of course—as it is not
This argument is meritless on both procedural and contested—that he was middle aged and very
conceptual grounds. First, the district court held slight of stature. Further, there are seemingly
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