Page 30 - TPA Journal March April 2024
P. 30
ing the suppression hearing, nor did anybody tes- seizures and searches will not issue “without prob-
tify. The trial court did not hear any testimony and able cause.” Probable cause exists, under the total-
simply reviewed the pleadings, the 2012 suppres- ity of the circumstances, if the evidence shows at
sion hearing transcript, and testimony from the the moment of arrest that “the facts and circum-
2016 trial. The trial court ultimately granted the stances within the officer’s knowledge and of
suppression motion pertaining to the warrantless which he had reasonably trustworthy information
arrest based on those records. were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believ-
ing that the arrested person had committed or was
. . . committing an offense.” “Probable cause to
arrest must point like a beacon toward the specif-
In short, the evidence to be suppressed did not
ic person being arrested.”
include any physical evidence and was limited to
what “arose” from his arrest. This would include In that vein, Texas law also requires statutory
such post-arrest evidence as McGuire’s statements authority to arrest when the arrest is warrantless.
after arrest, dashcam video and audio recordings Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 14.03(a)(1)
with McGuire in the police vehicle after arrest, provides one such avenue of authority for war-
and McGuire’s booking photo. rantless arrests:
This brings us to the present-day appeal by the Any peace officer may arrest, with-
State to this Court. Under the record brought out warrant . . . persons found in
before this Court, it is unclear what specific evi- suspicious places and under cir-
dence Appellee sought to suppress. The record cumstances which reasonably
does not show whether such evidence would ben- show that such persons have been
efit or hurt either party’s case. guilty of some felony, violation of
Title 9, Chapter 42, Penal Code,
. . .
breach of the peace, or offense
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on under Section 49.02, Penal Code,
a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. or are about to commit some
Almost complete deference is given to the court’s offense against the laws; . . . .
determination of historical facts and its rulings on
the application of law to those questions of fact. We have historically recognized that an overly lib-
eral construction of the authority to determine
The same deference is afforded to the trial court in
deciding mixed questions of law and fact that are what is a “suspicious place” could give police the
arbitrary and unlawful “power to pass summary
based on an assessment of credibility and
demeanor. For mixed questions of law and fact judgment upon a human being, and incarcerate
him in a dungeon, although innocent of any crime
that do not involve an evaluation of credibility and
demeanor, however, we conduct a de novo review. against law or society.” Thus, in order to maintain
“the obvious legislative intent of Chapter 14, pro-
If the trial court’s ruling is correct on any theory of
law applicable to the case and reasonably support- tection of individual rights and furtherance of
legitimate law enforcement,” this Court has recog-
ed by the evidence, the ruling will be upheld.
nized that the use of “persons found in suspicious
Federal and State constitutional provisions explic- places” under Article 14.03 should “authorize
itly protects the right of the people to be free from warrantless arrests in only limited situations.” In
“unreasonable seizures and searches.” Generally, doing so, our case law construing this statutory
searches and seizures may only be conducted pur- authority has evolved often parallel to the require-
suant to a warrant unless a recognized exception to ments of the Fourth Amendment on the federal
the warrant requirement applies. Warrants for side.
26 www.texaspoliceassociation.com • (512) 458-3140 Texas Police Journal