Page 35 - TPA Journal November December 2024
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oughfares and into private residences, doctor’s      CSLI is approaching “GPS-level precision,” with
        offices, political headquarters, and other potential-  wireless carriers having the capability to “pin-
        ly revealing locales.”  “Accordingly, when the       point a phone’s location within 50 meters.”
        Government tracks the location of a cell phone it    Many of the concerns expressed by Chief Justice
        achieves near perfect surveillance, as if it had     Roberts in his  Carpenter  opinion are highly
        attached an ankle monitor to the phone’s user.”      salient in the context of geofence warrants.
        The Court concluded that the criminal defendant      Perhaps the most alarming aspect of geofences is
        had a “reasonable expectation of privacy in the      the potential for “permeating police surveillance.”
        whole of his physical movements.”                    As Chief Justice Roberts explained, modern cell
        The Court then addressed the third-party doctrine,   phones enable the government to achieve “near
        which provides that generally, “a person has no      perfect surveillance”; carrying one of these
        legitimate expectation of privacy in information     devices is essentially a prerequisite to participa-
        he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”   The   tion in modern society, and users “compulsively
        Court declined to apply the third-party doctrine to  carry cell phones with them all the time.”
        the collection of CSLI, notwithstanding the fact     Geofences also exemplify the Court’s concern
        that this data is technically voluntarily provided   with pinpoint location data—this technology pro-
        from users to private wireless carriers.  As the     vides more precise location data than either CSLI
        Court noted, there is a “world of difference         or GPS.  Furthermore, obtaining data through
        between the limited types of personal informa-       geofences, like obtaining data through CSLI, is
        tion” addressed in the Court’s prior third-party     “remarkably cheap, easy, and efficient compared
        doctrine precedent “and the exhaustive chronicle     to traditional investigative tools.”  With “just the
        of location information casually collected by wire-  click of a button,” the government can search the
        less carriers today.”  Furthermore, the Court found  pinpoint locations of over half a billion people
        the notion that users “voluntarily” provide this     with Location History enabled.
        information to private entities dubious. Carrying a  But while we see the parallels between CSLI and
        cell phone is “indispensable to participation in     Location History data, our colleagues on the
        modern society,” and, “[a]part from disconnecting    Fourth Circuit—the first federal Circuit to address
        the phone from the network, there is no way to       whether geofencing is a “search” subject to the
        avoid leaving behind a trail of location data.”  “As  Fourth Amendment—saw Location History data
        a result, in no meaningful sense does the user vol-  differently.  Characterizing Location History data
        untarily ‘assume[] the risk’ of turning over a com-  as nothing more than a “record of a person’s sin-
        prehensive dossier of his physical movements.”       gle, brief trip,” the Fourth Circuit found that
        Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in          geofencing does not contravene a person’s “rea-
        Carpenter  speaks at length about the privacy        sonable expectation of privacy” because the data
        interests inherent in location data, and it expresses  implicated by geofences is “far less revealing than
        grave concern with the government being able to      that obtained in Jones[ or] Carpenter.”  With great
        comprehensively track a person’s movement with       respect to our colleagues on the Fourth Circuit, we
        relative ease due to the ubiquity of cell phone pos-  disagree. While it is true that geofences tend to be
        session.  The Court acknowledged “some basic         limited temporally, the potential intrusiveness of
        guideposts” in resolving questions related to the    even a snapshot of precise location data should
        Fourth Amendment’s protections of privacy inter-     not be understated.  As two commentators noted:
        ests, including securing “the privacies of life
        against arbitrary power,” and placing “obstacles in      [E]ven a brief snapshot can expose high-
        the way of a too permeating police surveillance.”        ly sensitive information—think a visit to
        The Court also recognized the necessity of apply-        “the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the
        ing the Fourth  Amendment to systems of                  abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment cen-
        advanced technology, expressing concern that             ter, the strip club, the criminal defense


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