Page 40 - TPA Journal November December 2024
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knowledge, or of which he has reasonably trust-      ecution cases must “show more than the subjec-
        worthy information, are sufficient to occasion a     tive animus of an officer and a subsequent injury;
        person of reasonable prudence to believe an          plaintiffs must also prove as a threshold matter
        offense has been committed.”                         that the decision to press charges was objectively
        “The qualified immunity inquiry includes two         unreasonable because it was not supported by
        parts”: (1) “whether the officer’s alleged conduct   probable cause.”
        has violated a federal right” and (2) “whether the   Here, as in Nieves, the officers had probable cause
        right in question was ‘clearly established’ at the   to make the arrests for disorderly conduct and
        time of the alleged violation, such that the officer  resisting arrest, thus precluding the arrestees’
        was on notice of the unlawfulness of his or her      retaliatory arrest claims. Still, on appeal, Plaintiffs
        conduct.”   To determine clearly established law     argue that “probable cause does not foreclose this
        we look to cases decided at the “at the time of the  lawsuit since Grisham and Everard were treated
        violation.”  “The law can be clearly established     differently from others because of their First
        despite notable factual distinctions between the     Amendment activities.” Notably, the Nieves Court
        precedents relied on and the cases then before the   did delineate a carveout to the probable cause pre-
        Court, so long as the prior decisions gave reason-   requisite in holding that a plaintiff asserting a
        able warning that the conduct then at issue violat-  retaliatory arrest claim does not have to establish
        ed constitutional rights.”                           the absence of probable cause “when [the] plain-
        Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has held    tiff presents objective evidence that he was arrest-
        that officers cannot execute their law enforcement   ed when otherwise similarly situated individuals
        duties while someone is engaging in speech,          not engaged in the same sort of protected speech
        where probable cause exists. Rather, officers can-   had not been.”  Plaintiffs contend that other armed
        not execute their law enforcement duties to search   protestors were not arrested because the officers
        and seize in retaliation of speech or as imposed     personally opposed “the message that Everard and
        censorship.                                          Grisham conveyed.” However, as the magistrate
        Plaintiffs argue that Defendants “retaliated against  judge noted, other protestors were arrested, but
        them for peacefully exercising their First           they simply did not join in this lawsuit. Further,
        Amendment right to protest the Ordinance.”  A        caselaw does not require that the officers seize all
        retaliatory arrest claim requires that (1) Plaintiffs  “otherwise similarly situated individuals.”  Rather,
        were engaged in constitutionally protected activi-   “where officers have probable cause to make
        ty, (2) Defendants caused them to suffer an injury   arrests” they may not disproportionately or unfair-
        that would chill a person of ordinary firmness       ly “exercise their discretion not to do so.”  The
        from continuing to engage in that activity, and (3)  “no-probable-cause requirement” applies in the
        Defendants’ adverse actions were substantially       instant case because Plaintiffs have not presented
        motivated by the Plaintiffs’ exercise of constitu-   objective evidence, beyond conclusory state-
        tionally protected conduct.                          ments, that they were arrested “when otherwise
        Still, a retaliatory criminal prosecution “in viola-  similarly situated individuals not engaged in the
        tion of the First Amendment [is] actionable only if  same sort of protected speech had not been.”
        a plaintiff can also prove . . . absence of probable  Consequently, the officers are entitled to qualified
        cause to prosecute.”   Additionally, in  Nieves v.   immunity because there was probable cause to
        Bartlett, the Supreme Court emphasized that a        arrest Everard and Grisham pursuant to a pre-
        “plaintiff pressing a retaliatory arrest claim” based  sumptively constitutional and enforceable statute.
        on speech protected by the First Amendment gen-      And, as the record reflects, the officers were
        erally “must plead and prove the absence of prob-    objectively reasonable in believing that such prob-
        able cause for the arrest.”  Moreover, the Nieves    able cause existed.
        Court established that plaintiffs in retaliatory pros-




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