Page 39 - TPA Journal November December 2024

kneel in a slow and controlled manner. Officer return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party.
Ruiz and Chief Valenciano both grasped Everard’s “A panel may affirm summary judgment on any
arms and moved him from his knees to a prone ground supported by the record, even if it is dif-
(lying flat on his stomach) position. The officers ferent from that relied on by the district court.”
turned Grisham over on his stomach, placed him Although we view the evidence favorably to the
in handcuffs, and searched him. nonmovant, we nevertheless “assign greater
Everard was charged with disorderly conduct for weight, even at the summary judgment stage, to
displaying a firearm in a manner causing alarm, the video recording taken at the scene.” “[T]he
and Grisham was charged with interference with ultimate determination of whether there is proba-
the duties of a public servant. All charges were ble cause for the arrest is a question of law [this
dismissed for insufficient evidence. court] review[s] de novo.”
Based on the above incident, Everard and Grisham As an initial matter, we note that Plaintiffs do not
filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging viola- challenge the district court’s holding as to their
tions of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth claims regarding unlawful search, failure to inter-
Amendment rights. Plaintiffs and Defendants filed vene, deprivation of property, failure to provide
cross- motions for summary judgment. The dis- medical care, or malicious prosecution.
trict court referred the matter to the magistrate Accordingly, the issues are forfeited on appeal.
judge, who adjudicated the parties’ competing Plaintiffs instead focus on the district court’s grant
motions and issued a report and recommendation of summary judgment as to (1) their First
to the district court. The district court considered Amendment claims, (2) their Fourth Amendment
and adopted the recommended order, granting claims, and (3) the City’s liability pursuant to
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Monell.
Plaintiffs’ (1) Fourth Amendment claims for The record in this case includes videotape exhibits
excessive force, unlawful arrest, and unlawful capturing the events in question. As discussed, this
search and seizure; (2) First Amendment claims court must “vie[w] the facts in the light depicted
for prevention of protected conduct and retaliation by the videotape” that captured the events under-
for protected conduct; (3) Fourteenth Amendment lying Plaintiffs’ claims. Thus, in viewing the facts
claims for deprivation of property and failure to in the light depicted by the videotape, as Scott v.
provide medical care; (4) failure to intervene Harris directs, we agree that the magistrate judge
claims; (5) malicious prosecution claims; and (6) did not err in his recounting of the facts. All the
municipal liability claims. Everard and Grisham material facts as described by the magistrate
appealed. judge—from the arrival of responding officers to
We conduct a de novo review of a district court’s the subsequent arrests of Everard and Grisham—
grant of summary judgment. “Summary judgment were supported by the video record.
is proper ‘if the movant shows that there is no gen- Accordingly, in the qualified immunity context,
uine dispute as to any material fact and the movant the magistrate judge did not err in concluding that
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” there were no genuine disputes of material fact
However, “[a] qualified immunity defense alters underlying the determination that (1) the officers
the usual summary judgment burden of proof” had probable cause to believe that Plaintiffs were
because, to overcome qualified immunity, engaging in criminal activity and (2) the officers
Plaintiffs “must rebut the defense by establishing were not objectively unreasonable in believing
a genuine [dispute of material fact] as to whether such probable cause existed. “It is well estab-
the official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated lished that under the Fourth Amendment a war-
clearly established law.” rantless arrest must be based on probable cause.”
A dispute regarding a material fact is “genuine” if “Probable cause exists when the facts and circum-
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could stances within the arresting officer’s personal

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