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Abstract

In the case of hardcore cartels, sophisticated cartel operators generally
take measures to conceal their conduct and avoid entering into formal,

documented arrangements, meaning that direct evidence of a formal cartel

agreement may not be available. In such cases, the best evidence that may
be available of an agreement between competitors is circumstantial evidence

of communication between them. A country with a new enforcement regime

and/or lacking a strong competition culture may however face particular

obstacles in obtaining evidence, and particularly direct evidence of anticompetitive
conduct. The country may not have leniency program, which is a tool to

obtain a primary source of direct evidence, nor be able to generate cooperation

with individuals or businesses engaged in economic activity that could

162 ‡≈à¡∑’Ë Ò ªï∑’Ë ˆ˜