Page 28 - RBS GRG F Teaching Note
P. 28

The Bank’s ‘fire-sale’ Response


               Create GRG as a ‘clearinghouse’ to extract, from supposedly

               failing businesses, fees and fines, clawing back loans

               secured against property and taking equity stakes in these

               businesses before they were sold off.


                              “West Register, the bank could acquire their prime

                              properties at fire-sale prices, converting them

                              from risky loan exposures into owned assets that
                              the bank planned to sell off later for a capital gain.


                              And, by quarantining the properties in a network
                              of subsidiaries owned by West Register, the bank

                              substantially reduced the amount of capital it had

                              to freeze on its balance sheet as a regulatory

                              buffer against potential losses, freeing up extra

                              cash.”


               In order to facilitate the necessary breach of covenant GRG

               acted against business loans which were secured against

               property, and most agreements contained a “loan-to-value”

               covenant stipulating that the customer’s borrowing must

               not exceed 70-80% of the value of their assets.


               The fall in the value of properties after 2008 put customers

               in breach of their loan-to-value (LTV) covenants and allowed

               the bank to transfer them to GRG forcing them to sell or

               repay their loans.


               West Register thereby reduced the bank’s exposure to “non-

               core” risky real estate loans whilst allowing it to acquire
               cheaply, prime assets that it could then sell at a profit.
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