Page 28 - RBS GRG F Teaching Note
P. 28
The Bank’s ‘fire-sale’ Response
Create GRG as a ‘clearinghouse’ to extract, from supposedly
failing businesses, fees and fines, clawing back loans
secured against property and taking equity stakes in these
businesses before they were sold off.
“West Register, the bank could acquire their prime
properties at fire-sale prices, converting them
from risky loan exposures into owned assets that
the bank planned to sell off later for a capital gain.
And, by quarantining the properties in a network
of subsidiaries owned by West Register, the bank
substantially reduced the amount of capital it had
to freeze on its balance sheet as a regulatory
buffer against potential losses, freeing up extra
cash.”
In order to facilitate the necessary breach of covenant GRG
acted against business loans which were secured against
property, and most agreements contained a “loan-to-value”
covenant stipulating that the customer’s borrowing must
not exceed 70-80% of the value of their assets.
The fall in the value of properties after 2008 put customers
in breach of their loan-to-value (LTV) covenants and allowed
the bank to transfer them to GRG forcing them to sell or
repay their loans.
West Register thereby reduced the bank’s exposure to “non-
core” risky real estate loans whilst allowing it to acquire
cheaply, prime assets that it could then sell at a profit.