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Creative Insight: The Redistribution Theory 129

This idea explains why responses that require remote associations are delayed
compared to responses that only require closely associated concepts. It has
the disadvantage that it presupposes that knowledge is duplicated in the two
brain hemispheres and encoded differently in each. The hypothesis explains
well what happens in remote association tasks, but it is not clear how it applies
to complex problem-solving tasks.

Assembling a Complete Theory

The redistribution theory proposed in this chapter emphasizes the constrain-
ing effects of unhelpful prior knowledge as the cause of unwarranted impasses.
The two Gestalt principles of functional fixedness and Einstellung are not
competing explanations but special cases of the prior knowledge principle.
The idea of a progress criterion adds a new twist but is compatible and com-
plementary rather than competing. Likewise, the present theory emphasizes
the power of negative feedback to resolve impasses by affecting the balance
between competing options. Impasses are not incubation periods, but the two
are similar enough to make explanations for positive incubation effects rele-
vant for a theory of insight. The two principles of differential rates of forgetting
and of fortuitous reminding do not assume any other effect of failure than to
convince the problem solver to take a pause. The pause, in turn, allows forget-
ting and fortuitous events to occur. If we construe these principles as rivals
to the redistribution theory, we risk causing a battle about which theory is
best. But the redistribution explanation for the resolution of impasses and the
various explanations of incubation are not mutually exclusive and hence not
in competition. In conjunction, they can explain a broader swath of creative
thought processes than either principle by itself. In due time, we will possess a
set of principles by which we can explain all such processes.