Page 400 - Deep Learning
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     Elements of a Unified Theory            383
               For example, layered processing – the presence of both excitatory and
            inhibitory links within a layer and the presence of downward feedback links –
            might have emerged because they improve the accuracy and utility of vision,
            independent of any need to override prior experience and rerepresent unfa
            miliar situations. But once these features were in place, they provided the pos
            sibility of reperceiving the environment. likewise, the capability of growing
            cognitive skills by specializing them might have evolved as a component of the
            ability to acquire new skills. But once specialization and conflictresolution
            mechanisms that are sensitive to specificity were in place, they provided the
            ability to override an already learned skill as well as creating a new one. Finally,
            the ability to retrieve declarative representations from memory is useful in a
            wide range of knowledgeusing scenarios, but once this ability was in place,
            remote associations – bisociations – became possible. For each microtheory,
            it is possible to hypothesize selective pressures toward greater capacity that
            are independent of the need for nonmonotonic change but which eventually
            endowed the relevant cognitive mechanisms with the properties that make
            such changes possible. This twophase scenario is speculative but consistent
            with how complex adaptations evolve.
                   ON THE DIFFICULTY OF NONMONOTONIC CHANGE
            scientific theories have many functions. Conceptual advances sometimes sup
            port new technologies, but another, equally important function is to help us
            understand puzzling aspects of life. The most interesting puzzle regarding non
            monotonic change is its low probability of occurring. Why are we so eager to
            push forward but so reluctant to draw back to leap in a new direction? if we are
            capable, in the sense of possessing the requisite cognitive processes, to see, think,
            speak and act in novel ways, why do we so often fail to do so when the circum
            stances call for it? We are stuck on unfamiliar problems – slow to adapt old hab
            its to novel tasks but quick to sweep beliefcontradicting information under the
            cognitive rug. When goal attainment is blocked, our first response is to expand
            more effort, to execute the tried and true strategies with greater energy, greater
            attention to detail and higher fidelity to the intended course of action. We push
            forward before we draw back to leap. Why is this the case, if we evolved a capa
            bility for nonmonotonic change during the huntergatherer era?
               The first part of the answer is that the twostage evolutionary process envi
            sioned in the previous section did not replace monotonic with nonmonotonic
            learning, just as the evolution of vision did not replace the prior senses of smell
            and touch. The new function was superimposed on top of prior functionality.





