Page 467 - Deep Learning

450 Notes to Pages 341–359

an expanse between the waters to separate water from water.’ So God made the
expanse and separated the water under the expanse from the water above it. And
it was so. … And God said, ‘Let the water under the sky be gathered to one place,
and let dry ground appear.’ And it was so. … Then God said, ‘Let the land produce
vegetation: seed-bearing plants and trees on the land that bear fruit with seed in it,
according to their various kinds.’ And it was so” (Genesis 1–11, New International
Version). This description lacks any causal mechanism. Creation in this sense
differs from production through a material process like natural selection. Those
who say that natural selection is God’s way of creating new species resolve their
cognitive dissonance by abandoning the distinction between these two meanings
of “create.”
20. Ranney and Schank (1998), Ranney, Schank, Mosmann and Montoya (1993) and
Thagard (1992).
21. Rokeach (1970, p. 167).
22. Koestler (1964).
23. The repeated application of cognitive schemas to anything in the environment
to which they might apply is a theme that runs across Piaget’s writings; see, e.g.,
Piaget (1963).
24. See Gentner (1983) and Markman and Gentner (2000). Key works on analogy
include Carbonell (1983, 1986), Falkenheimer, Forbus and Gentner (1989), Forbus,
Gentner and Law (1994), Holyoak and Thagard (1989ab), Keane, Ledgeway and
Duff (1994) and Veloso and Carbonell (1993). For the idea that structural similar-
ity also provides a mechanism for schema application, see, e.g., Gick and Holyoak
(1980, 1983), Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett and Thagard (1986), Ohlsson (1993b),
Ohlsson and Hemmerich (1999) and Ohlsson and Lehtinen (1997).
25. Quine (1951, p. 39).
26. Gazzinaga (1992), French, Laskov and Scharff (1989) and Jerne (1967).
27. Vincent (1993).
28. See Aunger (2002), Blackmore (1999), Brodie (1996) and Lynch, (1996).
29. The papers collected by Polk and Seifert (2002) and by Sun (2008) provide exam-
ples of a wide range of computer models of cognitive processes.
30. The ontological shift idea was first stated in Chi (1992) and has since undergone
considerable evolution (Chi, 1997, 2005; Chi & Brem, 2009; Chi, Slotta & de
Leeuw, 1994). It is supported by a literature review (Reiner, Slotta, Chi & Resnick,
2000), laboratory studies (Chi, 2005; Slotta, Chi & Joram, 1995), instructional
interventions (Chi & Rosco, 2002; Slotta & Chi, 2006) and by comparisons to
historical cases of conceptual change in science (Chi & Hausmann, 2003). For an
experimental approach to the study of category shifts, see also Cosejo, Oesterreich
and Ohlsson (2009).
31. The difficulty of conceptual change is attributed to a lack of awareness of the
need for such a shift (Chi & Rosco, 2002, p. 18), a lack of the correct target cat-
egory (Chi & Rosco, 2002, p. 19) and “the cognitive demand of re-inheriting all
the attributes of a concept based on its new categorical membership” (Chi, 2005,
p. 188).
32. D. Kuhn (1989) articulates this argument.