Page 60 - Banking Finance February 2026
P. 60

CASE STUDY






                 Credit risk failure and governance


                           lessons: The Yes Bank case







         Introduction                                         A key contributor to Yes Bank's credit risk was excessive
                                                              concentration. A significant portion of the loan book was
         Credit risk remains the most material risk on bank balance
         sheets, particularly in emerging markets where rapid credit  exposed to a small set of corporate groups in infrastructure,
         growth often outpaces risk governance. One of the most  power, real estate, telecom, and NBFCs. Many of these
         instructive recent examples of credit risk failure in India is  sectors were experiencing delayed cash flows, regulatory
         the crisis faced by Yes Bank, which culminated in regulatory  uncertainty, and leverage-driven expansion.
         intervention in March 2020.                          Instead of moderating exposure as stress indicators
                                                              emerged, the bank continued extending credit, often
         The Yes Bank episode is not a case of sudden fraud or
         external shock alone. Rather, it reflects the cumulative  through complex structures, refinancing, or short-term
         impact of weak credit underwriting, excessive concentration  instruments. This increased correlation risk across the
         risk, inadequate recognition of stress, and governance  portfolio, making the bank vulnerable to sector-wide
         failures over multiple years. This case study examines how  downturns.
         credit risk accumulated within the bank, how warning signals Weak underwriting and reliance on promoter
         were missed or deferred, and what lessons banks can draw strength
         for future credit risk management.                   Credit assessment practices at  Yes Bank placed

         Background of the institution                        disproportionate reliance on promoter reputation, projected
                                                              cash flows, and asset valuations. In several cases, lending
         Yes Bank was founded in 2004 as a private sector bank with
                                                              decisions were reportedly influenced more by relationship
         a strong focus on corporate and wholesale banking. In its
                                                              considerations than conservative risk metrics.
         early years, the bank distinguished itself through aggressive
         growth, relationship-driven lending, and a strong presence  Collateral valuations, particularly in real estate-linked
         in infrastructure, real estate, and leveraged corporate  exposures, proved optimistic. Debt service capacity
         segments.                                            assumptions were often contingent on future project
                                                              completion or asset monetisation, increasing vulnerability
         Between FY2010 and FY2017, Yes Bank reported consistently
                                                              to execution delays.
         high growth in advances and profitability. Loan book
         expansion significantly outpaced industry averages, Asset quality recognition and regulatory
         particularly in non-retail segments. While this growth  divergence
         strategy boosted market perception and valuation, it also
         increased exposure to cyclical and highly leveraged Delayed recognition of stress
         borrowers.                                           One of the most critical issues in the Yes Bank case was
         The bank's credit portfolio became increasingly concentrated  delayed recognition of non-performing assets (NPAs). While
         in a limited number of large corporate groups, many of  stress was visible in borrower financials and sector
         which operated in sectors already facing structural stress.  performance, the bank continued classifying several
                                                              exposures as standard or restructured rather than impaired.
         Build-up of credit risk exposure
                                                              This led to a growing divergence between the bank's
         Concentration risk and sectoral exposure             reported asset quality and supervisory assessments.


            52 | 2026 | FEBRUARY                                                           | BANKING FINANCE
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