Page 27 - Insurance Times December 2023

nominated as the Rescue Coordination Centre, but the mind that there are far more convenient places to scuttle
distances involved were great, and the resources available the ship than in the middle of the South Pacific, where the
meagre. The nearest long range aircraft, a French naval chances of a speedy rescue were not good. As it was, the
plane, was at Mururoa Atoll, 650 miles to the west of Cumberland’s crew spent a very uncomfortable 28 hours in
Pitcairn, while the nearest ship, the British container vessel the boats, and if Tom Christian had not been scanning the
ACT 5, was 460 miles to the east. The only thing the air waves on June 12th, the outcome of the matter might
Cumberlande’s survivors had on their side was the weather, have been very different.
which had now become a flat calm. The Cumberlande’s radio
officer, using a portable lifeboat radio, remained in contact After examining all the evidence, the Court of Inquiry
with Pitcarin’s Radio Operator, who kept the survivors concluded that the Cumberland was lost through a crack in
advised of the progress of the rescue operation. the ship’s side plating which resulted in the flooding of her
Nos. 1 and 2 holds. The recorded weak state of the bulkhead
At 1830 hrs, just as the night was starting to loom the sky, between the two holds was held to be a contributory factor,
the French naval aircraft from Mururoa arrived overhead it being implied that this bulkhead probably collapsed. The
and dropped flares, followed by a package containing food discovery of water in No. 1 bilges on the 9th, and again on
and water, but the package was lost in the darkness. Radio the 11th morning, indicates that the crack in the ship’s side
contact was maintained with Pitcairn throughout the night, plating–if there was one–almost certainly first appeared
and at 0736 hrs on June 13th, Pitcarin’s Radio Operator below the waterline in that hold. But what could have
passed the good news that the British ship “ACT 5” was caused the crack remains a matter for debate.
coming towards them, and would arrive that evening, at
around 1840 hrs. It was fully dark, when at 1900 hrs, the The most likely causes of a ship being holed below the
lights of the ACT 5 were seen approaching from the east. waterline are through collision with another ship, a rock, or
a shoal, violent, traumatic occurrences unlikely to go
Unfortunately, then, the sky clouded over, the wind unnoticed. It is certain that no other ship was involved with
freshened from the northwest, and heavy rain lashed down. the Cumberland, and evidence given by her officers was to
Yet, the master of the 27,000-ton ACT 5 manoeuvred his the effect that she did not strike any underwater
ship with carefully enough, making a good lee for the obstruction. Their evidence was supported by the courses
lifeboats to come alongside. All the twenty-nine crew reportedly steered, which when plotted on the charts were
members of the Cumberland were safely aboard the clear of any known shoal or rock.
containership by 2030 hrs. The ACT 5 set course for Pitcairn,
then 135 miles away, with the empty lifeboats in tow, having That left only metal fatigue as a possible cause of any
in mind the desperate need of boats on the island. fracture in the ship’s side. When this was considered by the
Unfortunately, the motor lifeboat was lost in the early hours Court of Inquiry, it came to light that the Cumberland had a
of June 14th. The other boat also broke adrift soon after history of cracks in her hull plating. In May 1982, following
daylight, but by this time the ACT 5 was close to Pitcairn. a passage in particularly rough weather, water was found
After heaving to off Pitcairn for about 40 minutes, the in No. 1 hold, which was traced to two significant cracks in
rescue ship continued on to Auckland, where she landed the the port side shell plating low down in the hold. These were
Cumberland survivors on June 22. gouged out and welded up. Eight months later, in January
1983, No. 1 hold was again found to be making water, and
The Court of Inquiry held in Hong Kong in October 1988 to an inspection of the hold revealed a 16 inch long crack on
investigate the loss of the Cumberland looked at all
the port side near the previous repair. In April of that year,
possibilities, including the deliberate sinking of the ship by yet another crack opened up in the same area. When the
her crew for insurance purposes. In the case of the
ship went for a Special Survey in December 1983, a detailed
Cumberland, the two forward holds could have been examination was made of her hull in No. 1 hold, this time a
deliberately flooded, only by filling them with fire hoses small fracture being reported.
through the access hatches, or by removing the nonreturn
valves in the engine room and flooding through the bilge A permanent repair was made by cropping and renewing
lines. The use of either method is long and laborious, and part of the shell plating in the area. Although up until the
could not have been done without most of the crew being time of founding no further hull cracking was reported, it
aware of what was going on. The truth would then surely seems clear that there was some inherent weakness in the
have been revealed at the inquiry. It must also be borne in Cumberland’s plating on the port side of No. 1 hold. This

The Insurance Times December 2023 25