Page 110 - Operations Strategy

TARgETing And OPERATiOns fOCus 85
● Variety focus – A company may wish to segment its operations in terms of the num-
ber of different activities (usually dictated by the number of different products or
services) it is engaged in. So, for example, one site may concentrate on relatively low
variety or standardised products and services while another concentrates on high
variety or customised products and services.
● Volume focus – High-volume operations, with their emphasis on standardisation and
repetition, are likely to need different process technologies, labour skills and plan-
ning and control systems from those with lower volume. Volume focus extends this
thinking to the creation of separate operations for different volume requirements.
● Process requirements focus – Here, a particular technology is the point of focus for the
operation. This allows the organisation to concentrate on extending its knowledge
and expertise about the process. Over the life cycle of a production/service system,
the likely advantage to be gained from a process focus will change. As an operation
starts up and moves into the growth phase, building process capability will be criti-
cal; however, as volumes stabilise, the process itself will become more stable. A pro-
cess focus can also become very significant as volumes decline and the organisation
seeks to redirect its operations. However, many firms choose to close an operation
rather than redirect it.

example burning your bridges (or boats) 15

The nature of focus is that it is not ambiguous. Opting for excellence in a narrow set of objectives
at the expense of the ability to be excellent at the others calls for a significant level of commit-
ment to the objectives that have been chosen. The idea of commitment to a strategy has long
been debated in business strategy and, before that, in military strategy.
A classic military illustration of commitment is shown in Figure 2.13. Two armies want to
occupy an island, though neither is particularly keen to fight the other for it. Suppose Army 1
occupies the island pre-emptively and burns the bridge behind it. Army 2 is likely to cede the
island because it realises that Army 1 has no option other than to fight if Army 2 attacks. By
restricting its own flexibility (to retreat) and ensuring its commitment, Army 1 has won the
island without having to fight.

Figure 2.13 burning bridges behind you increases commitment but reduces flexibility

Army 1

Island
Army 2

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