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Spain y 99

e People’s Army was formed out of the parts of the Spanish army that remained
loyal to the Republic. Volunteers from around the world came to the defense of the Spanish
republic and formed seven international brigades. According to the figures of one of the
brigade leaders, K. Sverchevsky, the total number of international volunteer troops was
no less than 42,000. Volunteers from fifty-four nations of the world were enlisted in the
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Republican army. 6
e Soviet Union could not remain on the sidelines. V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko arrived
in Spain. In 1917 he had been one of the key figures during the Communist takeover in
Russia. He had been among the leaders who stormed the Winter Palace, and had personally
arrested the provisional government. Having taken down the legal government, Antonov-
Ovseenko entered the illegal government that was not recognized by Russia’s allies, but was
recognized by her enemies with whom Russia was in a state of war. In 1936 Stalin appointed
Antonov-Ovseenko general consul of the Soviet Union in Barcelona. He began with recom-
mending to the Spanish Republic’s government to hide the gold reserves of the country.
Where should they hide it? In Moscow. e Spanish gold reserves were brought out of the
country, and never again returned. ey say that the anarchists were thieves. at was true.
But the gigantic reserves of Spanish gold were taken away not by anarchists, but by the un-
selfish Communists. e Spanish gold reserves were payment for the supply of weapons. e
supply was indeed a large one, but it should openly be declared that the Soviet Union did
not support the government of the Spanish Republic out of honorable feelings, but for gold,
which Antonov-Ovseenko brought out of the country. 7
Stalin appointed Jan Karlovich Berzin, commander of the 4th Directorate of the General
Staff of the Red Army, to the position of chief military advisor to the Spanish Republican
army. Overall, 2,065 commanders of various ranks were sent from the Red Army to Spain:
772 pilots, 351 tankers, 100 artillerists, 222 general military advisors, and 204 interpreters.
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Additionally, through the NKVD line, the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and
other administrations, several hundred more Soviet diplomats, intelligence and counterintel-
ligence officers, saboteurs, journalists, agitators, party workers, and military industry special-
ists were sent to Spain. e total number of volunteers, including civilian specialists, was
around three thousand.
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Stalin sent to Spain 648 warplanes, 347 tanks, 60 armored cars, 1,186 artillery weap-
ons, 20,486 machine guns, and 497,813 rifles. Aside from this, Spain received from the
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Soviet Union shells, cartridges, bombs, military equipment, food supplies, fuel, lubricants,
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and medications. ese deliveries of arms could have been much larger, but Spain was
blockaded. Soviet merchant ships sailed out of Black Sea ports. In the Mediterranean Sea,
the Soviet Union had neither a military fleet nor military naval bases. Defenseless merchant
ships crossed the entire Mediterranean Sea to reach Spanish shores. From the Black Sea straits
to the destination ports, these ships were followed by Italian and German airplanes and
warships. And at the end of their destination, near the Spanish coast, they were awaited by
General Franco’s warships, airplanes, and submarines. Nonetheless, despite the blockade,
Stalin managed to transfer to Spain a huge, by any standards, amount of strategic cargo.
In order to understand the seriousness of Stalin’s intent, let us assess several of the
commanders he sent to Spain. ey were then lieutenants, captains, and colonels. However,
they were the most promising commanders of the Red Army, and Stalin had noted them for