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solidarity with the Spanish people, who were fighting against wild bands of fascists. During
a short time workers and farmers donated millions of rubles to raise funds for the Spanish
fighters.” 15
I was shocked by this. In 1936, the Soviet people watched anxiously events in remote
Spain, expressed outrage at the actions of the insurgents, held meetings of workers in factories
and peasants in the fields, and gathered their hard-earned kopeks to help the Spanish people.
Meanwhile, three years before this, the Soviet Union had been ravaged by a terrible famine,
which was accompanied by cannibalism and the eating of cadavers. And this did not cause any
anxiety to the Soviet people. ey did not hold meetings, nor did they collect aid. Soviet peo-
ple were not upset by the simple fact that their brothers, sisters, and neighbors were dying of
hunger by the millions, while Stalin exported grain abroad by the millions of tons. Our people
carry responsibility for all the people in the world, while being completely irresponsible toward
their own. In 1936 in Spain there were no concentration camps, hostages were not yet being
executed, but still the Soviet people were terribly upset and anxious. Meanwhile, slave labor
flourished in the Soviet Union, millions of people were in concentration camps and prisons,
and this did not upset the Soviet people or make them anxious in the least. On December
27, 1932, internal passports were introduced in the Soviet Union, without which it was im-
possible to work, find a place to live, or move about around the country. e passports were
introduced in the midst of hunger, in order to more effectively counter the flight of the peas-
ant population from starving regions into cities or into more prosperous parts of the country.
ese passports were handed out only to city dwellers. But the peasants, who comprised the
majority of the population, were not supposed to get a passport. e Soviet peasant was rel-
egated to the position of a slave who could not leave his owner. And Stalin’s military advisors,
future generals and marshals, instead of fighting for the freedom of their own people, strove
to fight for the freedom of Spanish peasants, who unlike the Soviet ones were free and had the
right to go anywhere they wanted, including abroad.
Everything I read about the war in Spain surprised me. Here is an example of a fact that
at first glance seems of little importance. e most important advisor to the Republican army
was Yan Berzin, commander of the 4th Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army.
What was the 4th Directorate? In the early 1960s the Soviet Union experienced an
almost hysterical wave of laudation for the Soviet intelligence agent Richard Sorge. Films
and television programs about him were aired, books and articles were published, lectures
read, his name was given to streets and places, and projects for monuments were widely dis-
cussed. It was declared that Richard Sorge was recruited and trained by Jan Berzin, the chief
of the 4th Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army. Right away, it was explained to
the people what the 4th Directorate was. It was the name given to the military intelligence
service of the Red Army in the 1920s and 1930s. Now this organization is denoted by three
letters—GRU, which in Russian stand for Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff
of the Soviet Armed Forces. But why was the head of all Soviet advisors in Spain the chief of
intelligence and not some experienced field commander?
During the course of the war, several thousand children of Spanish Communists were
transported to the Soviet Union. is is a special and tragic story. ey were trained to
become fighters on secret fronts during the Cold War in Latin America and Africa. ey
served as secret agents and special forces. One group was assigned to protect and keep a
watchful eye on Fidel Castro. e fate of foreign volunteers in Spain is no less interesting.