Page 143 - The Chief Culprit

104 y e Chief Culprit

was not lost, because they could be brought to a clash in Poland. So in the end of 1938 Stalin
drastically changed all his propaganda. All anti-Hitler propaganda in the Soviet Union was
brought to an abrupt stop. Now Stalin’s priority was to calm Hitler: go to Poland, I will not
be in your way.
When I was very young, I was surprised by an image: two generals are standing and
smiling. One is Hitler’s general, the other Stalin’s. is photo was taken in September 1939,
during the joint Soviet-Nazi parade commemorating the bloody division of Poland between
Stalin and Hitler. I was drawn to this shot like a magnet. e German general was the fa-
mous tanker Guderian. He has a friendly smile. But this does not mean anything. Behind the
friendly smile, he obviously hides cruel intentions. But who is this naïve Soviet commander?
Why is he smiling? Obviously, he was fooled by the Nazis. e naïve Soviet commander
was Brigade Commander S. Krivoshein. And if Krivoshein had pleasant conversations with
a Nazi, this does not at all mean that Stalin’s commander was fooled by the German. In his
memoirs, he told of the mood among his subordinates: “We made a pact with the Germans,
but this does not mean anything. . . . Now is the best time for a final and constructive resolu-
tion of all world problems.” 18
e joint Soviet-Nazi military parade was such an unexpected and unusual event that
no Soviet commander would take the challenge of developing specific details of such a pa-
rade. Before making any decision any military officer would make sure that his superior
officer approved and supported it, and the superior would do the same with his higher com-
mand. In any case all the details were supposed to be immediately reported to and vetted by
Stalin. In this particular case we shouldn’t blame Soviet military officers for lack of initiative
or for being incapable of making decisions on their own. After all, the joint military parade
is a political military manifestation of the intentions of both nations to the rest of the world.
No one can do this without the clearance of every single detail at the highest political level.
is is why we have every reason to believe that from the Soviet side the chief stage director
of this show was Stalin; nobody else would ever dare to take such responsibility.
At that point Stalin was not afraid of Hitler. In August 1939 Stalin cheated him, and in
September Stalin was openly making Hitler look ridiculous. e German side was represent-
ed by Panzer general Heinz Guderian. His rank was equal to lieutenant-general, and at the
time he was a corps commander. According to military-diplomatic etiquette and traditions,
the Soviet side was supposed to be represented by a commander of equal rank. But Stalin
sent Semion Krivoshein, who was a brigade commander and whose rank was Combrig—two
ranks beneath Guderian. ere were plenty of senior Soviet military officers in Brest at this
moment whose rank equaled that of Guderian, including the 4th Army commander, Comcor
Vassiliy Chuykov. But Stalin decided to send a low-ranking Combrig for the joint parade.
Stalin’s message to Hitler was simple: you sent a corps commander to greet me, but you
were only worthy of being greeted by a simple Combrig.
And that was not all. Stalin opted to send a brigade commander who several months
prior was in Spain, where he bravely fought against German Panzers. To rub it in, Stalin de-
cided to humiliate Hitler further—Semion Krivoshein, the commanding Soviet officer of the
joint Soviet-Nazi military parade in Brest, was Jewish.
e majority of contemporary historians believe that Stalin was afraid of Hitler and was
trying to avoid giving him any reason for attack. Stalin’s attitude in September 1939 proves
the opposite.