Page 146 - The Chief Culprit

Stalin’s Trap for Hitler y 107

Germany, or push Hitler to actions that would prompt France and Britain to declare war
on Germany.
Having received approval from the British and French governments for talks, Stalin
immediately found himself in a situation in which he could not lose. For Stalin, two options
were open: either the Soviet delegation would set new demands and force Britain and France
to start a war against Germany; or Britain and France would refuse to invade Germany, the
talks would fail, and it would be possible to accuse Britain and France of being too lax on
the aggressor, while Stalin himself could sign a pact with Hitler.
e Soviet delegation set forth insatiable demands: We have no common border with
Germany, so our troops need corridors through Poland!
is demand was unacceptable for Poland, and unnecessary for the Soviet Union. It
was unacceptable because the Polish government and people knew the nature of the Red
Army and the Soviet secret police. In 1920, the Polish people saw the Red Army on their
land, and understood that a new arrival of “liberators” would turn into occupation, mass
shootings, and terror against all layers of society. Several months after these talks, Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania allowed the placing of Soviet garrisons on their territories—and fell
into Communist slavery, which lasted half a century. If Stalin wanted peace, why did he
need corridors in Poland? K. E. Voroshilov, then a member of the Politburo, the People’s
Commissar for Defense, and a Marshal of the Soviet Union, declared at the talks: “Since
the Soviet Union has no common border with Germany . . . there are no roads for engaging
the aggressor.” 3
e absence of common borders with Hitler’s Germany was a great asset for the Soviet
Union. If the Soviet Union was thinking in terms of defense or neutrality in case of war, the
Red Army needed no corridors to pass through Polish territory. But Stalin was not plan-
ning on defense, and certainly not planning on staying out of the war. He needed corridors
through Polish territory on one hand in order to establish a Communist regime in Poland,
and on the other hand because the corridors enabled him to deliver a surprise attack to
Germany from the rear, in case it became engaged in a war against France and Britain. No
other use for passages through Poland can be thought of.
ere were other proposals from the Soviet side: Let France and Britain start a war
against Germany not only in the case of direct German aggression, but in case of “indi-
4
rect aggression.” What “indirect aggression” meant only Stalin and his diplomats knew. If
the proposals of the Soviet delegation had been accepted, Stalin (justifiably) could have de-
manded that France and Britain start a war against Germany in response to any action by the
German government. e wording was very loose, and anything can be labeled “indirect ag-
gression.” e scenario of war in this case was simplified: in answer to an action by Germany,
France and Britain, according to Stalin’s demands, were forced to act against her. e Soviet
Union would act against her as well, but on Polish territory not on its own—very convenient
and safe.
In any event, the main theater of operations would unfold between France and Germany,
and then fresh Soviet troops would carry out decisive strikes into the rear of German forces
through the Polish territories.
During the course of the talks, the French and British delegations, wishing to prove the
seriousness of their intents, gave the Soviet side very important information that should not
have come into Stalin’s possession.