Page 151 - The Chief Culprit

112 y e Chief Culprit

not present, Stalin was. But Hitler is at fault for the starting of the war, while Stalin is not.
Stalin entered history as an innocent victim and the liberator of Europe.
e invasion of the German troops into Poland had other consequences too: on
September 3, 1939, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany. Already on the third
day Germany was involved in a two-front war; that is, it wound up in an unwinnable situ-
ation. Since Germany practically lacked strategic raw materials, the two-front war was fatal
for Germany.
Lack of raw materials not only prohibited Germany from conducting a two-front war,
but also a prolonged single-front war. e only hope was for blitzkrieg—instant defeat of
the opponent. France could be defeated in a lightning war, but Great Britain is an island
nation. To defeat Britain, long and serious preparation is needed, as well as a powerful navy
that is equal to or exceeds the British navy, and air dominance is needed too. e German
navy lagged significantly behind the British navy. German air power was insufficient to crush
British industry and achieve air superiority. erefore, on the third day the war already looked
long and unpromising for Germany.
Furthermore, Britain had a special relationship with the United States. e United
States could side with Britain at any moment that was convenient. Germany did not have
such allies. Only while he was in a position of power could Hitler rely on Stalin’s friend-
ship. In a prolonged war against Britain and her allies, Hitler would inevitably exhaust his
resources. In September 1939, the German government repeatedly reminded the government
of the USSR about their obligation and demanded the Red Army’s invasion of Poland ac-
cording to the agreement. e Soviet government would refuse—not right away, but with a
two- to three-day delay. For example, in response to the German demarche of September 3,
the head of the Soviet government and its foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, responded
on September 5: “We agree with you that concrete action has to be taken at an appropriate
time. However, we consider that such [a] time has not come yet. It is possible that we are
mistaken, but it appears to us that excessive haste could cause us harm and facilitate unifica-
tion among our enemies.” 1
e German government kept repeating its demands and kept getting refused. Red
Army units started military action in Poland only after two and a half weeks—September
17. Stalin’s troops committed similar, or maybe even worse, atrocities in Poland, but Great
Britain and France did not declare war on the Soviet Union. Great Britain, France, and their
allies were interested in preventing Germany from using Soviet strategic resources. To do so,
it was necessary to keep Stalin at their side at any cost and, in case of war between Germany
and the Soviet Union, to keep the Red Army from being defeated.
As a result of the pact signed in Moscow in 1939 Stalin achieved a war, one which he
desired and for which he had planned and prepared for a long time: e nations of Western
Europe were mired in a destructive war, but the Soviet Union remained neutral. Now Stalin
could wait for the total exhaustion and self-destruction of Central and Western Europe.
Hitler guessed Stalin’s intentions and in 1941 suddenly and almost fatally struck the Soviet
Union. In this critical situation, Stalin received free aid from the United States and Great
Britain, which in volume and quality did not have a historical precedent. At the same time,
the Soviet role in unleashing World War II was quickly and thoroughly forgotten. In the
final count, Poland, for whose freedom the Western European states had entered World War
II, did not gain its freedom, but was given, along with all of Central Europe and part of
Germany, into Stalin’s control.