Page 154 - The Chief Culprit

Blitzkrieg in Poland and Mongolia y 115

of the use of aviation grew sharply: planes took off, and before they even reached cruising al-
titude, unloaded their bombs, quickly returned, took more bombs, and repeated the process.
When Soviet tanks went far ahead, aviation could support them without relocating the bases.
Zhukov moved hospitals and supply bases to the front lines as well—supplying ammunition,
fuel, and everything necessary for battle was carried out quickly and efficiently, and evacuation
of the wounded did not demand excessive time, so after a short time the soldier found himself
on the operating table. Zhukov moved his and all other command posts to the front lines, so
he was personally able to see the battlefield panorama, and when the troops moved forward,
it was no effort for him to move his command post after them. During the preparations for
this offensive, Zhukov forbade almost all use of radio communication. Communication was
conducted mainly through wires with short sentences, which were understood only by the
two people speaking. e operation was prepared in complete secrecy. Each officer received
directions only within the frames of his duties and had no concept of the overall plan, the
scope, or the dates of the offensive. Actually, many people did not know about the offensive
at all. Zhukov fooled not only the Japanese spies but, before all, his own soldiers and officers.
Until the last moment, they thought that they were preparing defenses for a prolonged pe-
riod. If his own soldiers and officers believed this, the enemy surely did as well.
Disinformation gave the desired results: there had never been such a crushing defeat in
all of Japanese history. e defeat of the Japanese Sixth Army on the Khalkhin-Gol had stra-
tegic consequences. Japanese aggression in the direction of Mongolia and of the Soviet Union
was thwarted. Japanese generals decided to not take any more risks. eir efforts from then
on were aimed in a different direction—against the United States and the British colonies. In
the fall of 1941, during months critical for the Soviet Union, Japanese generals still heeded
the memory of Khalkhin-Gol and did not dare attack.
Khalkhin-Gol was the first lighting war of the twentieth century; it was blitzkrieg in
the purest form. It was the first time in history that large masses of tanks were used correctly:
to strike in depth. is was the prime example of unseen concentration of artillery in tight
areas of the front. It was an example of absolute surprise attacks—during the first hour and a
half of battle, the Japanese artillery did not fire a single shot and not a single Japanese plane
rose into the air.
At the time that the Soviet army was conducting its operation at Khalkhin-Gol, the
German army had no experience of conducting lightning-speed offensive operations and was
not even conducting any large-scale training operations using tank masses for sudden break-
through into the depth of the enemy’s defenses. e German command planned to conduct
2
the first of such training exercises in the fall of 1939. Due to Germany’s invasion of Poland
and the beginning of World War II, these training exercises were never conducted.
On August 29, 1939, Stalin gave Zhukov the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for his
lightning defeat of the Japanese Sixth Army. On September 1, Germany attacked Poland. It
is interesting to compare the two lightning operations: the Soviet one in Mongolia, and the
German in Poland. e difference lay in the fact that the whole world witnessed the German
actions in Poland. Embassies from all over the world were located in Warsaw; there were
many foreigners in Warsaw and other Polish cities, many journalists in particular. ey all
witnessed the war and described it in their newspapers and magazines. Hitler’s propaganda
demonstrated to the entire world the amazing successes of German troops. e whole world