Page 153 - The Chief Culprit
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19


                           Blitzkrieg in Poland and Mongolia










                      It was the Russians who first put forward the idea of amassing mobile units.
                                           —C G F. H, C  G S 
                                                                       G L A



                     n August 1939, on the river Khalkhin-Gol in Mongolia, aside from a crushing blow
                     there were other possible choices for action. Soviet troops could have, for example, taken
                 Idefensive positions and postponed the prepared attack. Aggression is always risky. In the
                 event of Soviet success, Japan would receive a lesson to last for years to come. In the event
                 of failure, the entire world would talk of Stalin’s army purges and accuse him of making the
                 army unfit for fighting. In the event of failure, Zhukov could be executed, but his blood
                 would not wash away the military’s disgrace.
                      On Saturday, August 19, 1939, Stalin sent to Zhukov only one code word: “Good.” A
                 few hours later, Zhukov delivered the blow. In Moscow, that historical day, August 19, had
                 just ended, but in Mongolia the sun was already rising over a new day. At 5:45 , 153 Soviet
                 bombers, under the cover of a corresponding number of fighters, carried out a surprise raid
                 over Japanese air bases and command posts. Artillery joined in immediately.  e artillery
                 softening-up was short (2 hours, 45 minutes), but unbelievably intense and powerful. During
                 the course of the artillery action, Soviet aviation carried out a second raid, and at 9:00 
                 tank units broke through Japanese defenses. Zhukov’s plan was simple. He conducted a clas-
                 sic operation of encirclement. Zhukov had a relatively weak center and two powerful flank
                 groups.  e center only holds the enemy, while the strike groups at the flanks do not enter
                 into prolonged battles but go around the main centers of resistance, and determinedly head
                 forward. On August 23, the fourth day of the attack, the circle drawn around Japanese troops
                 was tightened, and the rout began.
                                             1
                       e operation on the Khalkhin-Gol was brilliant in planning and in execution. Zhukov
                 took a lot of risks, but they were justified. Zhukov ordered the air bases moved as close to the
                 front lines as possible.  is allowed airplanes to carry less fuel and more bombs.  e intensity


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