Page 157 - The Chief Culprit

118 y e Chief Culprit

peacetime hospitals. Aviation bases also did not need to be moved—the air force could con-
duct its missions from permanent air bases. Command posts with communication lines also
stayed in place in underground bunkers. Only small mobile groups of commanders needed
to be sent forward.
However, not everything in Poland went as smoothly as shown in Goebbels’s propagan-
da and as described by some modern followers of Hitler. For some reason it is not popular to
speak of this, but the German blitzkrieg in Poland failed. On September 15, 1939, two weeks
after the start of World War II, the activity of the German air force substantially dropped; the
German army was almost completely out of fuel. is was the level of Hitler’s and his gener-
als’ understanding of modern warfare.
Forget all the tales by Soviet marshals and academics that the Red Army entered Poland
in 1939 out of fear that the Germans might go straight for Moscow. Hitler did not have such
strength. Even if he headed for Moscow in October 1939, the same exact thing would have
happened to his valiant army that happened in October 1941: it would have sunk in the
mud. e Wehrmacht lacked the fuel, bombs, and ammunition necessary to wage war against
the Soviet Union. In 1939 the Red Army entered Poland for different reasons. Most impor-
tantly, there was the fear that Hitler’s blitzkrieg would stop. It was already slowing down.
Stalin’s offensive in Poland allowed Hitler to transfer his forces from the eastern to the western
front with maximum efficiency. Imagine the situation: all German tanks and cars are stopped,
airplanes do not fly. e German army has many horses, though they are load-bearing horses,
not cavalry. In this situation, the Polish cavalry could have shown what it means to have su-
periority in strategic mobility . . . but once again, Stalin saved Hitler.
From the standpoint of grand strategy the operation in Poland was a total failure for
Hitler and his generals. It was the first suicidal act of Hitler’s Germany: they entered a war
having one enemy—Poland, and in two months brilliantly ended that war having Britain,
France, India, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and potentially the United States as en-
emies. A blitzkrieg cannot be used to win a war against all these nations, and Hitler had no
other options. As a result of the blitzkrieg in Poland, Hitler obtained a common border with
the “neutral” Soviet Union. Being at war with everyone, Hitler would have been better off
having a border with Poland than with the Soviet Union—anything could be expected of
comrade Stalin.
One more thing: Poland was not at all crushed by the blitzkrieg.
Immediately after the fall of the government in Warsaw, the Polish government in
London was created, and it was acknowledged by most nations of the world and by the
League of Nations. According to Polish tradition, underground local governments and an
underground state formed on occupied territory. Armed forces were revived. Using the most
cautious methods, the Polish Army counted 350,000 soldiers and officers, well trained, orga-
nized, and armed. Moreover, Poles fought against Hitler on all fronts: in Britain, France, Italy,
Africa, Holland, and the Soviet Union. Starting in 1939, the number of Polish formations
fighting Hitler constantly was around one million people. e blitzkrieg started in 1939 in
Poland, and ended in 1945 with the storming of Berlin, in which the Polish First and Second
armies took part.
We are told that Stalin purged his army, and after 1937–38 it was good for nothing. For
some reason, Khalkhin-Gol and the year 1939 are forgotten.