Page 162 - The Chief Culprit

Mobilization y 123

In a strange coincidence of events, it was precisely on this day—September 1, 1939—
that the fourth emergency session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ratified the universal
military draft. ere had been no such law in the history of the USSR. A surprising thing:
while children and adults were taught to fear Hitler, while Hitler was considered to be a ty-
rant and monster, the country could do without a draft. But as soon as a non-aggression pact
was signed, a universal mandatory draft all of a sudden became necessary.
Why did the Soviet Union need it? Soviet historians stated that the USSR took mea-
sures of precaution. Marshal of the Soviet Union K. A. Meretskov is one of the many of
those who assert that the law had a huge significance and was adopted “in the conditions
when World War II had already begun.” 6
Let us imagine the Polish-German border on that tragic morning: darkness, fog, fire,
motors roaring. Very few people in Poland understood what was happening, whether this was
a provocation or an unsanctioned border conflict that arose on its own. But the representa-
tives at the USSR Supreme Soviet already knew that this was no provocation, no conflict, and
no German-Polish or even European war—this was the beginning of a world war. ey knew
that they, the representatives, must meet in Moscow and take the corresponding measures.
Why did these representatives not act so efficiently when a similar thing happened on the
Soviet-German border in 1941?
On the morning of September 1, 1939, it was not only the Polish government and
the governments of the Western countries that did not know that World War II had started.
Hitler himself did not know it either. He started the war against Poland hoping that it would
be a local fight, like the taking of Czechoslovakia. As Colonel General of the Air Force A. S.
Yakovlev (at that time an aircraft designer, deputy people’s commissar of aviation industry,
and personal advisor to Stalin) concluded: “Hitler was sure that England and France [would]
not fight for Poland.” When, on September 3, Great Britain and France declared war on
7
Germany, this was an extremely shocking and unpleasant surprise for Hitler. He had not an-
ticipated this. For him, a “strange” war against Great Britain and France began on September
3. In the same month, an equally strange peace began in the East.
Any attempt to establish the exact date of the beginning of World War II and the time
that the USSR entered into it brings us to the date of August 19, 1939: Stalin stretched a
hand of friendship out to Hitler and signed the non-aggression pact, while on the same day
he issued an order to gather the representatives of the Supreme Soviet, so that at the time
World War II began they were already sitting in the Kremlin and unanimously voting in favor
of everything put before them. What a strange coincidence: the road to Moscow is long—for
some it takes ten to twelve days. In order to adopt the law on September 1, 1939, the order
to gather the representatives was issued on August 19, meaning that on August 19, 1939,
someone in Moscow already knew that in a couple of weeks World War II would begin and
a new draft law would be needed.
Chief of General Staff and Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov created
the theory of mobilization. He authored the book Brain of the Army. e third and final vol-
ume was published in 1929, and while the Soviet Army existed, this book served as a manual
for every Soviet officer and general. On Lenin’s desk, a copy of the book Mob Psychology by
Gustav le Bon had always been present, and on Stalin’s desk it was Shaposhnikov’s Brain of
the Army. e key to the success of Shaposhnikov’s book was in the simplicity with which
the material was presented, in the crystal-clear argumentation, and in the ability to explain