Page 165 - The Chief Culprit
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126  y   e Chief Culprit


                 Army (without the navy interior troops or border guards) numbered 1,871,600 men. By
                 June 22, 1941, the Red Army (again without the navy, interior troops, or border guards)
                 numbered 5,081,000 men. 9
                       e law adopted on September 1, 1939, allowed for an increase in the ranks of the
                 Red Army from 1.5 million men in the spring of 1939 to 5.7 million in the spring of 1941
                 without declaring mobilization and alarming the neighbors.  Additionally, this law allowed
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                 for the preparation of 18 million reservists, so that at any moment they could fill the ranks
                 with the desired number of soldiers.
                       is army development had a time limit, because Stalin called several age groups into
                 the Red Army at the same time—in essence, all the young men in the country.  e duration
                 of army service for the majority of the population—privates in ground forces and NKVD
                 (Political Police) forces—was two years, so the country had to enter a major war before
                 September 1, 1941. If not, all the young people would go home on September 1, 1941, and
                 then there would be almost nobody left to draft. All these new armies—assault and mecha-
                 nized corps, tanks, air force, and all other divisions—would have to be disbanded. It is im-
                 possible to maintain an armed force of this size without a war: it does not produce anything
                 and it consumes everything produced by the country.  e creation of such an army could
                 only lead to war.  e modern Russian ministry of defense acknowledges this. “No nation can
                 maintain a mobilized army with any intent other than war: the economy cannot stand the
                 strain, and the mobilized but unused army begins to decay.”   is was said about the mobi-
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                 lization conducted by Stalin starting on August 19, 1939.
                      When he made the decision to launch a secret mobilization, Stalin firmly knew that
                 in two years, in the summer of 1941, the Soviet Union must enter into a large war. Without
                 war, no terror could suffice to keep five million soldiers, who have already served their two
                 required years, in their barracks. It would be impossible to retain them in the army after their
                 terms in the army expired. To put it more simply, the decision to enter a large war was made
                 in the Kremlin in August 1939 and the deadline for entering the war was set—the summer
                 of 1941.
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