Page 163 - The Chief Culprit

124 y e Chief Culprit

the most complex problems in terms understandable by anybody. e third, concluding part
of the book is the most powerful. In the third volume Shaposhnikov examines the questions
of mobilization.
e theory was simple, understandable, logical, and unquestionably correct. Stalin un-
derstood it, appraised its worth, and added it to the base of his own strategy. is is why
reading Shaposhnikov’s works (as well as those of his supporters and opponents) and under-
standing the course of their thought helps us understand Stalin’s actions, which at first glance
seem illogical and unexplainable. e theory of mobilization, condensed and explained in
layman’s terms, consists of the following.

1. To achieve victory in a war, not only efforts of the entire army but full efforts by the
entire nation, the people, industry, transport, agriculture, etc., are necessary.
2. e nation cannot exist in a constant state of preparedness for war, just as a man cannot
constantly hold a gun in each hand. If he is a ways holding two guns, he cannot do any-
thing else. Similarly a nation cannot constantly expend all its resources on preparations
for war. Constant concentration of forces and expenditure of social resources on war
preparations ruin the nation. erefore, during peacetime the army and the military
industry must operate at a minimal level. However, the nation, its people, government
apparatus, industry, transport, agriculture, communication channels, ideological ap-
paratus, and so forth must be prepared for a maximally quick and full transition from
a peacetime to a wartime regime.
3. Mobilization is the transition of the entire country from a peacetime to a wartime
regime. Mobilization cannot be curbed or turned back. Metaphorically speaking, mo-
bilization is similar to thrusting one’s arm down, unlatching a holster, and aiming the
gun at the enemy with one’s finger already on the trigger.
4. Mobilization and war are inseparable. If you take out a gun and aim it at the enemy
with your finger on the trigger, you have to shoot. As soon as you begin to mobilize,
the enemy will mobilize as well. You take aim, and the enemy does the same, trying to
be faster than you by at least a fraction of a second. If you are a tiny bit of a second late,
he will kill you.
5. You cannot play games with mobilization: if you often brandish guns and aim them
at your neighbors with your fingers on the trigger, the outcome will not be a good one
for you.
6. Once the path of mobilization has been chosen, you have to follow it up to the end—start
a war.
7. Mobilization cannot be partial. Mobilization is a process similar to pregnancy. A
woman cannot be a little bit pregnant—the answer is always “yes” or “no.” e same
is true for mobilization in a country: either the entire government apparatus, indus-
try, transport, armed forces, population, and all the national resources are mobilized
toward war, or not.

ese ideas, in various orders and manners, are voiced by many different authors. B. M.
Shaposhnikov differed from his predecessors only in that he expressed the ideas clearly, brief-
ly, and concisely: “Mobilization is not only a symptom of war, it is war itself. An order by the
government to declare mobilization constitutes a de facto declaration of war. . . . In modern