Page 161 - The Chief Culprit

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course of the war: “During the meetings and conferences conducted by Stalin, discussions of
problems and the making of decisions frequently occurred without records, and often with-
3
out the corresponding paperwork marking the decision made.” In other words, decisions
were made but were not fixed on paper, just like in the Mafia.
Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov during the course of the war was deputy
to the Commander in Chief, that is, to Stalin: “Many political, military, and general govern-
ment questions were discussed and solved not only at the official meetings of the Politburo
and in the Central Committee Secretariat, but also in the evening at dinner in Stalin’s apart-
ment or at his dacha, where the Politburo members closest to him were usually present.” 4
Colonel General B. Vannikov was the People’s Commissar of Ammunition: “At the
meetings and conferences Stalin had a habit of discussing questions and making decisions
without protocols or records. . . . From this it is clear that the understanding of many events
just based on documents is incomplete and unclear, and in many cases incorrect.” 5
Hitler’s meetings were known for being held in the presence of large crowds. Everything
said by Hitler was fixed for history by three stenographers and a personal historian. Stalin’s
meetings on the other hand were simply secret gatherings of plotters and conspirators, in
spirit and in essence. No documents and no traces were left of these meetings. erefore, as
Stalin taught us, we will look not at the words, which are hidden from us, but at the actions,
which are in the open.
It is possible that World War II could have not occurred. e choice was up to Stalin.
He himself told this to his colleagues at the Politburo meeting on August 19, 1939: “If we
make a pact of mutual aid with Great Britain and France, Germany will give up Poland and
. . . the War will be averted.” Stalin did not make a pact with Great Britain and France;
thereby he did not try to avert a war. is day—August 19, 1939—was a long, difficult day.
is was a day filled with hopes and worries. is was the day when Stalin cast his fishing rod
into the brown swamp that was Hitler’s Germany. His hook had bait for Hitler: Danzig and
half of Poland. Take it! And as a free gift Germany got war against Great Britain and France.
is was the day when doubts crawled into the hearts of Stalin’s colleagues. Stalin had de-
cided to trick Hitler. Would Hitler believe him? Stalin could not possibly always win. Vyacheslav
Molotov worked on the scene as the head of the Soviet government and the People’s Commissar
of Foreign Affairs. When Molotov received the German ambassador von der Schulenburg in
his cabinet in the Kremlin, Stalin, Shaposhnikov, Beria, and Malenkov did not show them-
selves—they were behind the curtains, in Stalin’s cabinet. Molotov’s conversation with the
German ambassador was transmitted to Stalin’s office. Molotov worked brilliantly. e most
important thing was not to let the ambassador see Stalin’s interest in the issue of German-Polish
relations. Molotov did not reveal this interest; his attitude to the ambassador was: “All right,
let Ribbentrop come, perhaps we will agree on something, perhaps we will find a solution to
the question of Danzig and Poland.”
After the meeting, Schulenburg went to the German embassy to write a report, while
a heated discussion of the outcomes of the meeting was underway in Stalin’s cabinet. e
German ambassador had barely reached the embassy when he received a call from the
Kremlin: Molotov awaits you for a new meeting. is was a difficult day. And it ended in
Stalin’s victory.
At dawn on September 1, 1939, the German army began war against Poland. But in
the twentieth century, a war in Europe automatically meant a world war. e war quickly
engulfed all of Europe and practically the entire world.