Page 158 - The Chief Culprit

Blitzkrieg in Poland and Mongolia y 119

In 1939, the Red Army received a unique and invaluable experience in breaking through
powerful field defenses of the Japanese army in Mongolia. At that time not a single army in
the world had such experience. From this experience, the right conclusions were drawn: even
more attention needed to be given to the issue of breaking through defenses, and even more
sophisticated weapons, designed specifically for this purpose, had to be developed. e expe-
rience of Khalkhin-Gol showed: if the enemy has dug himself firmly into the ground, avia-
tion is incapable of breaking through such defenses, even if the bombing concentration is 80
tons per square kilometer. Artillery is needed. Soviet artillery was already the most powerful
in the world, but from September 1939 began the unfolding of new artillery formations and
the construction of new ammunition factories.
e Red Army command not only understood the extreme importance of supplying
troops, but had the unique experience of doing it in the extreme conditions at Khalkhin-Gol.
e Soviet troops counted 57,000 soldiers, 498 tanks, 500 guns, 385 armored cars, 515
airplanes, artillery transport, automobiles, etc. If everything necessary for life and battle was
to be brought to Mongolia from the supply bases in the Baikal military district, the distance
to be covered was roughly 1,500 kilometers. But not everything was in storage in the Baikal
region. If supplies were to be brought from factories and central storages the distance to be
covered was seven to eight thousand kilometers. e last stretch of railroad had very limited
load-bearing capacity and ended in a deserted steppe. For the next 650 to 700 kilometers
trucks were needed. e most common truck of that period could cover the round-trip of
1,300 to 1,400 kilometers, in good conditions, in roughly five days. e conditions were:
heat, dust, no water. People might get by in these conditions, but automobile radiators need
water. e troops needed to be supplied with everything. For example, wood to burn in field
kitchens. Technology wear and tear was tremendous, as was fuel expenditure. Cars needed to
be refueled several times along the way. Once the car had dropped off its cargo at Khalkhin-
Gol, it needed to make its way back—and once again, it had to be refueled, so it turned out
that the cars had to take away what they had just brought.
To this desert location the Soviets needed to supply by truck 25,000 tons of ammuni-
tion, 15,000 tons of fuel and lubricants, 4,000 tons of foodstuffs, 7,000 tons of fuel, and a
lot of other cargo. All this was supplied in such a fashion that the enemy did not even suspect
preparations for a sudden crushing attack. After such an operation, Soviet command quite
clearly understood the meaning of supplies in war.
Nevertheless, Khalkhin-Gol played a mean joke on Stalin and the entire Red Army.
In May 1940, Stalin introduced the titles of “general” and “admiral” into the Red Army.
Approximately one thousand top Red Army commanders became generals. But only three
of them received at that moment the top general rank—General of the Army. At that time,
this meant five-star lapels. e first of these men was Zhukov. Zhukov became the first of all
Soviet generals. Upon Zhukov’s return from Mongolia, Stalin entrusted Zhukov with the
most powerful of his military districts—the Kiev district. In February 1941 he appointed
Zhukov to the position of Chief of General Staff. In this position Zhukov prepared for the
war against Germany. On the German border (only on a much grander scale) he was to re-
peat everything he had implemented against the Japanese army. Zhukov created two mighty
mobile flank attack groups at the L’vov and Belostok bulges, and one group for an attack in
Romania.