Page 148 - The Chief Culprit

Stalin’s Trap for Hitler y 109

a coded cable from Zhukov informed Stalin that the main goal had been reached, that is,
that the Japanese did not suspect the impending attack. Stalin gave his final approval, and
Zhukov crushed the Japanese Sixth Army. Zhukov conducted a brilliantly sudden, quick, and
audacious operation. e lightning-speed defeat of the Japanese Sixth Army was a prelude to
World War II.
On that same day, August 19, 1939, a secret meeting of the Politburo took place, at
which Stalin gave a speech. is meeting of the Politburo has never been reported. On the
contrary, a lot of efforts were made to convince the whole world that such a meeting never
took place. Stalin himself told the newspaper Pravda on November 30, 1939, that any report
of a meeting of the Politburo on August 19, 1939, “is a sheer invention and lie.”
Years went by. e Soviet Union rotted and fell apart. Archives opened slightly. e
advisor to the Russian president, Colonel General D. A. Volkogonov, published an article in
the newspaper Izvestia on January 16, 1993: ere was a meeting of the Politburo on August
19, 1939. e general had [the] protocols in his hands. General Volkogonov says that only
secondary questions that were discussed at that meeting are preserved in the archives. But
even this revelation meant an end to public lies. With one line in a newspaper article, general
Volkogonov disclosed the lies of all Soviet leaders, including Stalin.
In the meantime, more brave and more truthful scientists continued the search. And
the document was found. It was kept in the Special Archives of the USSR, fund 7, index 1,
document 1223. Tatyana Semenovna Bushueva, a talented Russian historian, found it. e
document was first published in the December 1994 issue of Novyi Mir. is document fi-
nally proved that there was a meeting of the Politburo on that date. It turned out that Stalin
did indeed speak on that date, and not about secondary problems, but about most vital ones.
e document reveals that Stalin spoke of matters of primary, not secondary, importance.
e Russian historical community still denies the validity of this document, claiming it
is unclear how and when the document was made. On the other hand, many recently declas-
sified documents support the validity of this account. Let’s look at, for instance, a record in
the diary of the general secretary of the Comintern, Georgi Dimitrov, made on September
7, 1939. In the company of Molotov and Zhdanov, Stalin explained his new line of foreign
policy to the leader of the Comintern: “ e war is between two groups of capitalist nations
. . . but we are not against it, if they fight a bit and weaken each other. It would be good if
Germany could destabilize the positions of the wealthiest capitalist nations (of England espe-
cially). Hitler, without knowing it, is weakening the foundations of the capitalist system. . . .
We, in the meantime, are able to maneuver, to nudge one country on against the other, so
that the fight will be more intense.” 9
Below, as a source of comparison, are several excerpts from Stalin’s speech at the Politburo
session from August 19, 1939: “If we accept Germany’s proposal about the conclusion of a
pact regarding invasion, she will of course attack Poland, and France and England’s involve-
ment in this war will be inevitable. Western Europe will be subjected to serious disorders and
disturbances. Under these conditions, we will have many chances to stay on the sidelines of
the conflict, and we will be able to count on our advantageous entrance into the war. . . . It is
in the interest of the USSR—the motherland of workers— that the war unfolds between the
Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French block. It is necessary to do everything within our pow-
ers to make this war last as long as possible, in order to exhaust the two sides. It is precisely
for this reason that we must agree to signing the pact, proposed by Germany, and work on
making this war, once declared, last a maximum amount of time.”