Page 145 - The Chief Culprit
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106  y   e Chief Culprit


                      Each side increased its power. Soviet troops under Zhukov’s command were united
                 into the First Army group.  e Japanese forces formed the Sixth Army. During the course
                 of endless exhausting battles, Zhukov prepared a radical solution to the problem—a sudden,
                 crushing defeat of the Japanese Sixth Army.
                      Meanwhile, the tensions in Europe rose. Hitler demanded a review of the Versailles
                 Treaty. In accordance with this treaty, Eastern Prussia was separated from the main part of
                 Germany, and the city of Danzig was declared a free city. Hitler demanded to be given a cor-
                 ridor through Polish territory to build a highway and a railroad between Eastern Prussia and
                 mainland Germany. Additionally, the city of Danzig was to become a part of Germany.  e
                 Polish government refused to satisfy Hitler’s demands. Great Britain guaranteed Poland’s safe-
                 ty. Treaties guaranteeing mutual aid were signed between Great Britain, France, and Poland.
                  e governments of Great Britain and France decided to attract the Soviet Union to their
                 side.  is was a monstrous and fatal mistake.
                      If the USSR had been interested in safeguarding peace in Europe, it would not have
                 needed agreements with Great Britain and France. Stalin could have solved the problems of
                 Europe’s safety on his own. He only had to make his position clear to Hitler: If Hitler were to
                 begin a war against Poland, then he would not receive Soviet oil, grain, cotton, iron ore, mag-
                 nesium, chrome, zinc, nickel, and tin. Without these things, Hitler could not have fought. It
                 was possible to give an even harsher ultimatum: to declare independently of Britain, France,
                 and Poland that the Soviet Union would defend Polish territory from German aggression as
                 if it was its own, as it defended Mongolian territory from Japanese aggression. It would not
                 matter that the Polish government might not wish to have Soviet troops on Polish territory.
                 When Germany crushed the Polish army and dismantled the Polish government, the Red
                 Army would step into Poland and fight Germany. An invasion of Poland by the Germans
                 would be a signal for the Red Army to get ready for action. After the fall of the Polish state,
                 the Polish people would continue resistance, and would accept any help which the Soviet
                 Union would be willing to give in unlimited quantities.
                      In the summer of 1939 Hitler should have been reminded that Soviet pilots, sappers,
                 tankers, artillerists, and saboteurs fought in Spain against German military specialists.  ere
                 the war lasted almost three years. Sending soldiers and arms to Spain was difficult. Poland was
                 not Spain. Poland was much nearer.  e Soviet Union could send any number of “volunteers”
                 to Poland—5 or 10 million, plus any number of tanks, airplanes, and artillery. Hitler should
                 have been told that in the event of aggression against Poland, the Soviet Union would give
                 asylum to Polish refugees, would take in any number of Polish children, would offer train-
                 ing to Polish partisans and supply them with necessary equipment. In this case, war against
                 Poland could not be a lightning war. It would be a war of attrition, and Germany did not
                 have the resources for such a war.  at is how Stalin should have behaved. But he, for some
                 reason, insisted on having talks with Great Britain and France.
                      If a novice player sits down to play cards with a pro, he usually makes only one mis-
                 take: he picks up his cards. . . . On August 11, 1939, British and French delegations arrived
                 in Moscow for talks about joint action against Germany.  e governments of Great Britain
                 and France repeated the mistake of novice card-players.  ey sat down at the table with
                 Stalin’s pros, and lost the talks. Neither the British nor the French envoys understood Stalin’s
                 intentions. Stalin’s plan, in fact, was very simple: force France and Britain to declare war on
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