Page 62 - Leadership in the Indian Army

so. But Nathu Singh wanted command of his own battalion, and nothing else. He
appealed to the C-in-C, General Auchinleck, under whom he had served in the
NWFP and who had become his mentor. 1/7 Rajput had been part of Brigadier
Auchinleck’s brigade during the Mohmand operations in 1933. Nathu Singh was
the battalion’s Adjutant and could be seen galloping from company to company,
conveying orders and instructions under heavy fire. Auchinleck was impressed by
his courage and mentioned him in dispatches. This was to mark the beginning of a
long association between Nathu Singh and the ‘Auk’.
The Auk promptly had his transfer orders rescinded and Nathu Singh assumed
command of 1/7 Rajput on 17 September 1944. When World War II ended, he was
commanding the battalion in the Andamans, and accepted the formal surrender of
Japanese troops in the Andaman and Nicobar islands from Vice Admiral Teejo
Hara on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia. It was from
the Andamans that he wrote the famous letter to Auchinleck protesting against the
INA trials. Running into eight pages and couched in the strongest language, it
brings out his anger and anguish at the unfairness of the trials and its
repercussions.
In his letter dated 17 December 1945, Nathu enclosed a note headed
‘Repercussions of the INA Trails on the Minds of an Indian in the Army.’ It
summarised the following main reasons which led to the formation of the INA:

1. The general treatment of Indian officers, including denial of Indian food in messes, and the freedom
Indian clothes, listen to Indian music, or talk in their native language.
2. Brainwashing, propaganda and torture inflicted on Indian prisoners of war by the Japanese.
3. The British government tried to satisfy the demands for Indianisation of the army by opening e
Sandhurst and establishing the Prince of Wales Royal Military College (now called the Rashtriya
Military College or RIMC). With only five vacancies at Sandhurst, and only one school to prepare can
it was a hoax.
4. The Eight Unit Scheme, which ensured that British officers would not have to serve under Indians, effe
segregated them.
5. Restricting entry of Indians to Artillery, Navy and Air Force to negligible numbers.
6. The opening of the Indian Military Academy (IMA) was supposed to be a step towards Indian
However, whereas KCIOs were posted as company officers, ICOs were given command of pl
replacing VCOs. Hence, there was no reduction in the number of British officers.
7. After establishment of the IMA, Indians ceased to get King’s commissions and were offered
commissions instead. This conveyed the impression that Indian officers were inferior, and were equiv
the Provincial Civil Service, which is subordinate to the ICS, with which KCIOs were equated. As a
the upper classes stopped sending their wards to the army and preferred the ICS.
8. Discrimination between KCIOs and ICOs in terms of pay, though they did the same job and had to m
the same standard of living.
9. ICOs took the place of VCOs in the units, leading to reduction in vacancies for the latter.

10. As soon as World War II began, Indianisation was thrown to the winds, based on the premise that
officered by Indians could not be trusted.

Nathu Singh felt that all these factors, when put together, cast grave doubts on
whether the British were really serious about Indianisation, or whether they were