Page 67 - Leadership in the Indian Army

The Armed Forces Nationalisation Committee submitted its report on 12 May
1947. However, by this time the date of transfer of power had been advanced to 15
August 1947, and the committee’s recommendations became redundant. Nathu
Singh again wrote to the Defence Minister on 31 May 1947 after reading his
broadcast about partition. By this time, he had been transferred to Derajat Force in
Dera Ismail Khan. In his letter to Sardar Baldev Singh he wrote:

…I was amazed and shocked to read your broadcast in the paper about the possibility of a division of the
defence services. As an Indian I hate it. My conception is that to partition India would be equivalent of
committing rape of our Motherland and to partition the defence services means nothing short of civil war
within a few years time…. You will play an important part in the final shape of things to come. What
about your collecting a selected number of senior officers from all classes and communities from the
services and forcing down the throat of uncompromising political leaders the wisdom of a united India
staying within the Empire….
The Defence Minister replied, on 12 June 1947:

…I entirely agree with you that the division of India would be equivalent to committing rape of our
Motherland and the division of the Defence Forces will have a serious effect on the Military. If in case
there is no other solution to our political problem except the division of the country, then division of the
Army is inevitable, and this is what I have stated in my statement…I have noted your suggestion about
certain officers. We have at present a number of problems facing us and we will need the help of senior
Indian officers, but the final decision will have to be taken after the Provinces of Bengal and the Punjab
have given their verdict about partition of the Provinces.

Nathu Singh’s correspondence with Sardar Baldev clearly reveals his concern for
the unity and integrity of India. He felt that the British were deliberately
partitioning India to make it weak, even hoping that it would become
‘ungovernable’ and force the warring factions to ask them to extend their stay in
the colony. He felt that the armed forces, being unaffected by the virus of religion
and communalism, were capable of holding the country together and thereby
avoiding Partition. He never forgave Nehru and the other leaders for their failure
to consult the armed forces, or take them into confidence before deciding to accept
Partition. At this time, Nathu Singh was posted on the North West Frontier, from
where he could do little but write letters. Also, he was only a brigadier, and though
the most voluble of the KCIOs, he was not the seniormost among them. Had this
been so he may have been able to wield more influence and perhaps events might
have taken a different turn. It is pertinent to note here that in January 1947,
Cariappa had been sent to the Imperial Defence College in the UK, from where he
was recalled only in July, and was thus absent at this very critical juncture when
the fate of the Indian Army was being decided.
As mentioned earlier, when India achieved Independence, Nathu Singh was in
command of the Derajat Force at Dera Ismail Khan. He not only witnessed the
horrors of Partition but played an important role in the evacuation of refugees. He
was shocked at the behaviour of some British officers of the civil service, who
were encouraging the local Muslim population to threaten Hindus and force them