Page 70 - Leadership in the Indian Army

appears to pontificate, much as a schoolmaster would on a student’s essay
submitted for evaluation. His remarks about Nathu Singh’s ignorance of
international matters are ungracious, particularly when one recalls that having
been in office for just five months, he himself had little experience—of which fact
Nathu Singh was to subsequently remind him. He was also out, by almost a year,
in his assertion about British officers not being in command after 31 March 1948.
Nathu Singh’s tenure in Lucknow was short but eventful. He had to put down
two mutinies, one in Allahabad and the other in Jhansi. By nipping them in the
bud, Singh ensured that they did not affect the rest of the army. During this time,
he also had an unfortunate misunderstanding with Jawaharlal Nehru over his
absence at a parade held at Lucknow. Though he had known Nehru for several
years, their relations soured and were never cordial after this. In January 1948,
soon after taking charge, he had written a paper entitled ‘An Appreciation on the
Defence of India’ and forwarded it to Army HQ. He was greatly perturbed by a
directive issued from the office of the C-in-C that sought to reduce the size of the
regular army which numbered 2.5 million during World War II, to 150,000, with
an annual budget allocation of Rs 45 crore for the next three years. In the
preamble, he wrote:

We as soldiers must approach our leaders and submit our minimum requirements and make it clear that if
funds are not provided for such a force, the responsibility will be upon them. A soldier is but a servant of
the State. He must, however, point out any weaknesses in the defensive structure of the country with all
the emphasis at his command. In order to arrive at a correct appreciation, we must consider both military
and allied factors and not be swayed by any notions of idealism or allow political considerations to affect
our judgement….
A NEWLY CREATED NATION WHICH HAS ONLY JUST THROWN OFF HER BONDAGE OF
FOREIGN RULE OF 200 YEARS AND MORE CANNOT RISK A REVERSE ALMOST AT HER
REBIRTH .
…We must NOT decide on the size of our Defence Service on what we can financially afford but on
what we need in the form of a Modern Defence based on the following considerations:

a. What is the strength and armament of the present and potential enemies of India?
b. What is the force required by India to meet this threat?
c. What will be the cost of maintaining such a force?
d. What is the maximum amount the country can afford to pay for its defence forces?
e. To arrive at a compromise between (b), (c) and (d) above, consistent with the safety of our land.

Keeping the above in view, the Land Forces which India should maintain are given in the enclosed
appreciation. They are only my first thoughts.

Nathu Singh proceeded to outline the future framework of the Indian Army. By
present standards, he was extremely conservative—he asked for one corps
headquarters, one armoured division, two infantry divisions, one parachute
brigade, one armoured brigade, and the associated complement of Artillery,
Engineers and Signals. Though he restricted the number of infantry battalions to
28, he advocated a large complement of territorial army, which would provide the
second line of defence and boost the resources of the regular army during war.