Page 66 - Leadership in the Indian Army

Wade, Brigadier K.S. Thimayya, Wing Commander Mehr Singh and Commander
H.M.S. Choudri as members, and Lieutenant Colonel B.M. Kaul as Secretary.
Auchinleck had indicated that of the 22,000 officers in the Indian Army, only
8,500 were Indians. Even among them, most were ECOs, with very little service
or experience. If the Indian Army were to be nationalised immediately, officers
with less than nine years’ service would be commanding battalions. While this
might be acceptable in times of war, it would do incalculable harm during
peacetime, when officers would need to exercise judgement, wisdom, patience and
a knowledge of human nature, which could only be acquired with experience. He
warned against the dangers of entrusting the command of the army to officers who
lacked experience, especially in the prevailing situation when disruptive forces
were swaying public opinion.
Nathu Singh was in Meerut when he received a questionnaire that covered
several aspects of the problem. On 8 February 1947, he wrote a personal letter to
Thimayya, who was a member of the committee, in which he suggested that
before Indian officers gave evidence, each issue should first be discussed ‘in-
house’ by the army. Unless this was done, it was likely that the committee might
be misled, since most officers lacked knowledge and experience, and did not have
at their disposal the necessary data to arrive at valid conclusions. He
recommended that:

Each problem should be thrashed out by experienced Indian officers selected by the Nationalisation
Committee, prior to the matter coming up before them. It is in this manner that the Committee will be
able to get well-considered opinions for their final recommendations.
When Nathu Singh appeared before the committee, the British Prime Minister had
already announced the date for transfer of power as June 1948. Nathu Singh
suggested that by that date, Indians should be in full control of the army, and in
order to achieve this they must begin to hold responsible positions straightaway.
He strongly refuted the committee’s suggestion of a military mission to continue
after the transfer of power, recommending instead the appointment of advisers
who would be responsible to the Indian government instead of the War Office, as
would happen in the case of a military mission. He also objected to the suggestion
of keeping Indian officers as apprentices or understudies for important
appointments. Instead, he argued that they should be made deputies, which would
give them both authority as well as responsibility. When asked about the partition
of the army in case power was transferred to more than one state, Nathu Singh
replied that he was vehemently opposed to it. In fact, he said that it was not
possible to divide the army. He ended by saying: ‘I suggest that Indians should be
consulted in all future planning at AFHQ. This has not been done in the past. We
are going to be holding the baby soon. We must be taken into confidence.’