Page 183 - BUKU A CENTURY OF PARLIAMENTARY LIFE IN INDONESIA

A CENTURY OF PARLIAMENTARY LIFE
IN INDONESIA

particular, the PKI had proven to be capable of
mass mobilization.

On the other hand, the On the other hand, the PKI also began to take on
PKI also began to take a role and instill its influence in the National Front

on a role and instill its so that their role gradually seemed to be compet-
ing with the role of the Army and some Islamic
influence in the National parties. The military and Islamic groups could

Front so that their role only do their best to sustain the influence of PKI
because President Soekarno’s policies were in-
gradually seemed to be creasingly leaning to PKI. Therefore, the role of
competing with the role PKI increasingly overshadowed the military and
of the Army and some Islamic forces in the National Front.

Islamic parties. In the interaction between the PKI-military

(Army), after the various cases that occurred,
the military leaders finally decided not to openly
oppose the PKI in an effort to disband the PKI.
Under such circumstances, it was no longer pos-
sible for the military to be able to properly use the
influence of the National Front to oppose Presi-
dent Soekarno’s policies.

President Soekarno constantly tried to strike a balance between the mili-
tary and the PKI. This effort was at least relatively successful until the
mid-1960s, although there were many frictions between the two until the
end of the Liberation of West Irian. The Army finally chose to focus on
increasing and developing the role of functional groups that would facili-
tate Soekarno’s politics and paying attention to the strength/role of the
parties in dealing with the PKI.

The development on the PKI side was that they were already confident
and began to dare to compete with the Army because the number of PKI
sympathizers and followers had increased so much. The establishment
of branches continued to grow and had representatives in various state
representative bodies. However, the PKI did not have an effective strat-
egy to seize power from Soekarno’s hands.

The PKI enthusiastically welcomed and fully supported Indonesia’s for-
eign policy that would confront Malaysia. This revolutionary momentum
was very beneficial for the PKI because at least they hoped that in the
mind of the general public, the spirit of PKI had something in common

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