Page 207 - GQ 12

24* Bruno Chiesa and Miriam Goldstein

religious situation. The different maḏāhib can be divided into two main groups:
First, the idol worshippers (‘ovdei ‘avodah zarah), such as the Barāhima,26
who deny any prophecy; and second, those whose adherents acknowledge
the possibility of God sending a messenger bearing the divine message (rasūl
wa-risālah), Law, reward and punishment, promise and threat.

The latter group includes three nations (umam) who, notwithstanding
many contrasting beliefs, all affirm the credibility of the First Messenger
(al-rasūl al-awwal), i.e. Moses. However, the latter two nations (Edom and
Ishmael, i.e. Christians and Muslims) maintain that his Law was binding
only until the appearance of Christianity and that their own Law cannot
be superseded by any other Law. Yefet raises a number of objections to
this claim. First, it is impossible to recognise the credibility of the First
Messenger and at the same time to feel free to abandon the observance of
his Law. In addition to that, these two groups rely on very few witnesses to
establish the superiority of their own Law, while the Jews can rely on the
testimony of the whole nation.27

Yefet then turns to Islam and Christianity with specific arguments
directed at each. The main objections against the Muslims are familiar
from earlier polemics: first, that the Qur’ān does not mention any miracle
performed by Muḥammad – and miracles are indeed necessary proofs of
being a true prophet,28 and, secondly, that the alleged perfection (ḥusn)
and literary structure (ta’līf ) of the Qur’ān cannot constitute a firm proof:
otherwise, anyone able to write a fine and well-structured book would be
subject to recognition as a prophet.29

26 A summary of relevant sources and literature on this enigmatic group
can be found in S. Stroumsa, Freethinkers of medieval Islam (Leiden –
Boston – Köln: Brill, 1999), 145–162.

27 Yefet’s claim is likely based on that stated by al-Qirqisānī in Kitāb al-anwār
3.15.16 (ed. Nemoy, 301–302).

28 Yefet’s claim is likely based on that stated by al-Qirqisānī in Kitāb al-anwār
3.15.15 (ed. Nemoy, 300).

29 Here, Yefet seems to miss the point of the Muslim argument of the
inimitability of the Qur’ān (i‘ jāz), which is that no mortal is capable of
producing a book like the Qur’ān, hence it is divine. Al-Qirqisānī presents