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Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)  435

                In the first message, the AP sends a random number to the client device. On the client
               side, the random number is used in combination with the secret password (PSK) to gen-
               erate a response. The password can have a length of 8–64 characters. The result is then
               sent to the AP in a response message together with another random number. In the next
               step, the AP compares the response with the expected value that it has calculated itself.
               These can only be identical if both sides have used the same password for the process.
               The client device is authenticated if the values match. The AP then creates a session key
               which it encrypts with the common password and sends it to the client device. The client
               device deciphers the session key with the common password and returns a confirmation
               to the AP that the message was received correctly. This message also implicitly activates
               ciphering in both directions. In the final step, the AP informs the client device about the
               current key for deciphering broadcast frames. While there is an individual session key
               for each client device, the key for broadcast messages is the same for all devices, as
               broadcast frames must be deciphered by all devices simultaneously.
                The advantage of the use of individual session keys compared to the use of a pass-
               word as an input to the encryption and decryption algorithms is that the session key
               can be changed during an ongoing connection. This prevents brute force attacks that
               try to obtain the key by trying out all different combinations or by analyzing a large
               amount of data collected over time. A typical value for the update of the session key
               is one hour.
                While WPA‐PSK can protect a network against external attackers and eavesdroppers
               one internal weakness remains. An attacker who is aware of the Pre‐Shared Key (PSK)
               and, in addition, has observed the individual session key negotiation of another device
               can use this information to decrypt the data frames sent between this device and the
               access point. Network analysis software such as Wireshark have this functionality built‐
               in by default. This means that besides being aware of the password of a WPA‐PSK
               encrypted network, little technical knowledge is required to decipher packets being
               sent and received by other devices.


               6.7.3  WPA and WPA2 Enterprise Mode Authentication – EAP‐TLS
               In addition to WPA‐PSK authentication, which uses a common key (Pre‐Shared Key) in
               the AP and all client devices, there is also an enterprise mode with an individual key or
               certificate for each device. The keys or certificates are not stored in the access point but
               in central authentication servers. This allows companies to have several APs to cover a
               larger area without the need to store the keys in each AP. In addition, individual keys or
               certificates significantly increase overall security as network access can be granted and
               removed on a per‐user basis. The most popular protocols for communicating with an
               external authentication server are RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial In User
               Service) and the Microsoft Authentication Service.
                For WPA, a number of different authentication protocols have been specified to be
               compatible with as many external authentication servers as possible. These protocols
               are referred to as Extensible Authentication Protocols (EAPs). A popular authentication
               protocol is the Extensible Authentication Protocol – Transport Layer Security (EAP‐
               TLS) protocol, described in RFC 5216. The protocol uses certificates stored on the
                 client device and on the authentication server. Important parts of the certificate are
               the public keys of the client device and the authentication server. These are used to
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