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Sharp                                          Thinking







        No. 74                    Perspectives on Developments in the Law from The Sharp Law Firm, P.C.                    October 2012

        Appellate Court Moves Toward More Uniform Approach

        On Burden of Proof on Non-Custodial Parent Visitation


        By Rebecca L. Reinhardt, Rreinhardt@lotsharp.com, 618-242-0246

             The  Fourth  District  of  the  Illinois  Appellate  Court  has  reversed  its  prior  holding  regarding  the
        burden  of  proof  for  non-custodial  parents’  visitation  rights  and  moved  toward  a  more  uniform
        interpretation across the state on that issue.

             The Fourth District determined that it had been applying an erroneous standard for determining
        visitation  rights  of  non-custodial  parents.    In  Taylor  v.  Wills-Merrill,  2012  IL  App  (4th)  120212,  it
        reversed itself, putting the burden on the custodial parent who is seeking to limit visitation and holding
        that there is a presumptive right in the biological parent to reasonable visitation.

             Unusual  Fact  Situation.         In  Taylor,  after  seeing  a  social  networking
        profile  of a  woman  with  whom  he  had  had one  sexual encounter,  which  profile
        contained  a  photograph  of  a  child  who  resembled  him,  Taylor  contacted  the
        woman.  The woman indicated that the child indeed could be his.  DNA testing
        determined that Taylor was indeed the biological father.  However, the mother had
        listed  another  man  (her  husband)  as  the  father  on  the  birth  certificate  and  her
        husband had been fulfilling the role of the father to the child.  The marriage of the
        mother and her husband was dissolving and custody of the child was disputed.
        Taylor  petitioned  the  court  for  visitation,  and  the  husband  sought  to  prevent
        biological father from having any contact with the minor child.                                 Reinhardt

             The Circuit Court held that under the Fourth District’s decision in Ill. Dep’t of Public Aid ex rel.
        Gagnon-Dix v. Gagnon, 288 Ill.App.3d 424 (1997), the biological father had no presumptive right to
        visitation and that he had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that visits would be in
        the  child’s  best  interest.    Taylor  appealed  and  the  Appellate  Court  reversed,  stating  “there  is  a
        presumption that [biological father] is entitled to reasonable visitation rights unless visitation would
        endanger seriously  [the  child’s]  physical,  mental, moral,  or emotional health.   The  trial  court  erred
        when it placed the evidentiary burden on the biological father.”  The court went on to state that the
        circuit court “conscientiously evaluated the evidence but did so using a standard we no longer believe
        applies.  [The biological father] bore no burden of proof”.

             Interaction of Parentage, Marriage Acts at Issue.  Previously, in Gagnon, the Fourth
        District,  grappling  with  the  difficult  situation  of  a  biological  father  who  had  nothing  to  do  with  his
        biological child for 8 years, held that there is no presumption of reasonable visitation for the biological
        father  under  the  Parentage  Act  (750  ILCS  45).    Then  as  now,  §  14(a)(1)  of  the  Parentage  Act
        incorporated  “relevant  factors”  of  the  Marriage  and  Dissolution  of  Marriage  Act  (750  ILCS  5)
        (“Marriage  Act”)  for  visitation  privileges  involving  non-custodial  parents.    Section  607(a)  of  the
        Marriage Act states that a noncustodial parent is “entitled” to “reasonable” visitation unless visitation

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        Sharp  Thinking  is  an  occasional  newsletter  of  The  Sharp  Law  Firm,  P.C.  addressing  developments  in  the  law  which  may  be  of  interest.    Nothing  contained  in  Sharp
        Thinking  shall  be  construed  to  create  an  attorney-client  relation  where  none  previously  has  existed,  nor  with  respect  to  any  particular  matter.   The  perspectives  herein
        constitute educational material on general legal topics and are not legal advice applicable to any particular situation.  To establish an attorney-client relation or to obtain legal
        advice on your particular situation, contact a Sharp lawyer at the phone number or one of the addresses provided on page 2 of this newsletter.
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