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would  seriously  endanger  the  child’s  “physical,  mental,  moral  or  emotional  health.”  However,  the
        Gagnon court construed the Parentage Act’s reference to “relevant standards” language to mean that
        not  every  rule  applicable  in  a  dissolution  case  applies  in  a  parentage  case,  and  ruled  that  the
        presumption embodied in § 607(a) was not incorporated.

             Rejection  in  Other  Districts.        Gagnon  was  often  distinguished  or  completely  rejected  in
        other  districts.  For  example,  in  In  re  Melton,  314  Ill.App.3d  476  (2002),  the  First
        District stated, “Like divorce under the Marriage Act, proceedings under the Parentage
        Act  are  ‘entirely  statutory  in  origin  .  .  .  the  court’s  authority  is  limited  thereby.”
        Moreover, the First District said the Gagnon court cited no statutory authority for the
        shift in the burden of proof.  “We cannot accept the court’s strained construction of the
        phrase  ‘relevant  standards’,”  it  said.    “The  Marriage  Act  sets  out  the  factors  for
        determining  visitation  privileges  in  section  607(a),  and  those factors guide  visitation
        determinations under the  Parentage  Act because  they  are  the  ‘relevant  standards’ for determining
        visitation privileges.”

             In the Third District, Wenzelman v. Bennett, 322 Ill.App.3d 262 (2001), stated that “absent exigent
                           circumstances all biological parents enjoy a presumption that they are entitled to
                           visitation  with  their  children,  whether  visitation  is  requested  under  the  Illinois
                           Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act or the Illinois Parentage Act.”  The Third
                           District went on to clarify, “we interpret Gagnon to mean that any parent, in wedlock
                           or out of wedlock, that seeks to establish extensive visitation after eight years of no
                           contact  with  a  child  has  the  burden  to  show  that  visitation  is  in  the  child’s  best
                           interests.  Absent any indication that no prior relationship existed between parent
        and child, we determine that a presumption exists in favor of biological parents for visitation.”

             And the Fifth District, in Jines v. Jurich, 335 Ill.App.3d 1156 (2002), held that the burden was on
        the custodial parent seeking to restrict the visitation of the non-custodial parent.  “We disagree with
        Gagnon,”  it  said.  “The  Parentage  Act  requires  the  court  to  apply  the  ‘relevant  standards’  of  the
        Marriage Act to determine custody.  The clear import of referring to the standards that are relevant is
        to  direct the  court  in a  parentage  case to  the  sections of  the  Marriage  Act  that  address  the  issue
        raised by the case. If the issue in a case is visitation, then the court is to apply the portions of the
        Marriage Act that establish standards for visitation, and likewise for custody or joint custody.”

                              Better Result Finally Reached.             The recent decision in Taylor creates a
                          more  uniform  interpretation  of  the  Parentage  Act  across  the  state.    It  prevents
                          custodial parents in Parentage Act cases from asserting that non-custodial parents
                          are  treated differently  than those  in  dissolution  cases  where  the parties  had  been
                          previously married.  It also conforms to the statutory interpretation principles courts
                          are bound to follow.  Regardless of how bad the court felt the father in Gagnon was
                          for  not  seeing  his  child  for  8  years,  the  legislature  had  drafted  the  statute  very
                          clearly.    Any  burden  of  proof  placed  on  him  was  clearly  erroneous  under  the
                          Parentage Act.

                                                                                                      John\Sharp Thinking\#74.doc
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