Page 28 - John Hundley 2014

federal law; and (2) even if the claims would not be preempted, the court should exercise its
discretionary authority to deny any joinder that would destroy subject-matter jurisdiction.

Defendant accepted that § 1447(d) bars the review of remand orders, but
relied on City of Waco, Tex. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 293 U.S. 140, 143
(1934), and Good v. Voest-Alpine Indus., 398 F.3d 918, 921-23 (7th Cir. 2005),
when it argued that the court should review the court’s contemporaneous
decision to allow the amendments to the complaint, because the bar on
reviewing remand orders does not prevent review from separate, appealable
rulings that happened to be contained in the same document as the remand
order.

The court acknowledged the defendant’s argument, but recognized its misplacement. Defendant
was not helped by the doctrine established in Good and Waco, for the reason that the order allowing
the amendment to the complaint was not a “final order.” See Wingerter v. Chester Quarry Co., 185
F.3d 657, 662 (7th Cir. 1998). Therefore, the decision to allow the amendment was not reviewable
and the case had been properly remanded back to state court.

Opinion Limits Lay Representation

In Most Administrative Proceedings

Except in matters that would be small claims if brought in a circuit court, laypersons may not
represent corporations in either state or municipal administrative proceedings, according to the
majority of a panel in the Appellate Court’s First District.

Writing in Stone St. Partners, LLC v. City of Chicago Dep’t of Administrative Hearings, 2014 IL
App (1st) 123654, the majority said it would not deem the plaintiff limited liability company to have
waived improper service upon it through the participation in the administrative hearing of a layperson.
It declined to follow two opinions of other Appellate Court panels holding that laypersons could
represent corporations in unemployment benefit hearings.

In a partial dissent, the third member of the panel pointed out that the layperson involved was not
a member or employee of the LLC and hence was not authorized to represent the LLC in any event.

Noting the significant penalties and other effects that can result from such administrative
proceedings, the majority said that “[a]dministrative hearings, whether held by a municipality or a
state agency, necessarily implicate the full range of the powers of sovereign governments over
individuals and other entities. Their decisions can implicate the ability to practice a chosen profession
or engage in a business, and can result in the imposition of crushing financial sanctions. . . . The
similarity between modern administrative proceedings and traditional judicial ones compels us to
reject the City’s contention that the proceedings are so manifestly different that corporations can
appear at them through non-lawyers.”

Brenda\SharpThinking\#120.pdf
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