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Illinois law – that Harris had no duty to look beyond the face of the attachment order to
                        ascertain its validity”, on the premise that Hicks had “waived any argument on that point”,
                        and on the conclusion that “Hicks’s waiver is the death knell to his appeal”.  Arguably, the
                        Hicks result would not be binding if the issue were properly raised in the trial court.
                           Second,  while  the  court  spoke  in  terms  of  garnishees,  Hicks  involved  a  proceeding
                        under the Attachment Statute (735 ILCS 5/4-101 et seq.), which provides only a tempo-
                        rary,  pre-judgment  remedy  not  involving  turnover  of  assets  until  there  has  been  proper
                        service on the  real  defendant and proceedings resulting in a judgment.   The inference
                        that  Hicks’  statements  apply  in  what  more  commonly  are  called  garnishments
        (judgment  enforcement  proceedings  under  735  ILCS  5/12-701  et  seq.  and  735  ILCS  5/12-801  et
        seq.) is doubtful, although likely to be commonly drawn.

            Nothing  in  Hicks  purports  to  change  “black  letter”  Illinois  law  that  a  valid  underlying  judgment  is
        essential to those kinds of garnishments (e.g., 20 ILL. L. & PRAC. Garnishment § 3) and that the voidness
        of a judgment can be raised at any time, directly or collaterally, by anyone with whose right or interest the
        judgment conflicts (e.g., 23A ILL. L. & PRAC. Judgments §§ 157-58).  Hence it is doubtful whether the 7th
        Circuit intended to overrule cases stating that garnishees have a right and duty to raise any defect which
        makes the underlying judgment void, the exercise of which duty is the means of avoiding double liability.
        E.g., O’Toole v. Helio Products, 17 Ill.App.2d 82 (1958).
            But the theory of those cases – and the resultant duties placed on garnishees – long
        have  been  decried  as  unjust  and  impractical  by  persons  representing  banks  and  other
        institutions  commonly  subjected  to  post-judgment  garnishments.    Garnishment  summonses
        can reach anywhere in the state, so under such cases a garnishee in Cairo can be required to
        travel to Galena (495 miles) to make sure the purported judgment is good.  Indeed, because
        the validity of a judgment can depend on matters not evidenced in the court file  – such as
        whether the place of alleged service really was the defendant’s residence – even reviewing
        that file does not assure that the judgment is valid.  Cases such as O’Toole impose impractical
        and draconian duties on bystanders to the underlying dispute.

            Moreover,  because  of  the  federal  government’s  desire  to  have  child  support  withholding  orders
        enforceable  nationwide,  the  theory  that  an  employer  should  explore  the  validity  of  the  underlying
        proceedings has been disregarded in that context (e.g., 750 ILCS 22/502(b); 750 ILCS 28/35(c)).  While
        one can debate whether rules for wage withholding should apply to garnishment or attachment of non-
        wage  assets,  the  fact  is  that  the  two  cases  on  which  the  Hicks  court  relied  in  determining  that  the
        attachment order was “regular on its face” both arose under child support legislation.

            Perhaps most persuasive, commerce has changed since the days of O’Toole.  Then a release of
        funds or property in violation of dubious court papers was the volitional act of a human being, and usually
        did  not  have  to  occur  until  at  least  the  end  of  a  business  day.    With  the  advent  of  e-commerce,  the
        defendant  often  is  in  control,  his  decisions  to  be  implemented  immediately.    Hence  the  idea  that  a
        garnishee can determine the validity of the underlying judgment before deciding to comply is outmoded.
            On careful analysis, Hicks does not resolve these issues.  Hopefully, however, it will spur a debate
        leading the legislature to do so.
                                                                                                       John\SharpThinking\#18.doc.
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