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taking the bread down. In our case too, a person must repent by re-
gretting his misdeed and resolving never to repeat it but not by taking
action in a way that could endanger him.

I presented this question to my brother-in-law Rav Chaim
Kanievsky shlit”a, who explained that the Yaavetz’s intention is that if
possible, the sinner should try to draw the semen back into his body
despite the small risk of tragedy. When he writes, “If he brought this
about intentionally he must endanger himself,” he refers to taking
a small risk. Proof to this understanding can be adduced from the
Mishnah Berurah (248,26) who writes that although it is permitted
to set out on a journey [with a caravan into the desert] on the first
three days of the week, if a person knows with certainty that by doing
so he will have to desecrate Shabbos this too is forbidden (Radvaz,
77-87). “Accordingly,” writes the Mishnah Berurah, “[people] nowa-
days base themselves on this to slightly endanger themselves in order
to avoid desecrating Shabbos [after having joined a caravan] so as
not to render their departure forbidden retroactively.” The Mishnah
Berurah modifies the wording of the Magen Avraham (248,14, citing
the Knesses Hagedolah in the Notes of the Beis Yosef ibid.), who
writes that people endanger themselves in order to avoid desecrating
Shabbos. The Mishnah Berurah adds the word “slightly” writing, “to
slightly endanger themselves.” In other words, to seriously endanger
one’s life in order to avoid desecrating Shabbos so that one’s departure
should not be retroactively rendered forbidden is prohibited. Even
though this person has indeed sinned by joining the caravan in the
full knowledge that he would have to desecrate Shabbos, he is still not
allowed to endanger his life in order to cancel that sin retroactively.2

2. See earlier, siman 121, regarding the question of whether a physician whose
life is in danger is allowed to flee in the middle of conducting surgery despite
the fact that the patient will die, or whether he must risk his life by staying to
complete the operation in order to avoid having committed murder [because he
began the surgery intentionally]. There (s.v. od nireh) we cite the view of Kovetz
He’aros that he is expected to expose himself to great danger in order to avoid
retroactively violating the prohibition of murder and the usual permit for setting
aside Torah prohibitions in situations of danger to life [in this case, his own]

152 1 Medical-Halachic Responsa of Rav Zilberstein