Page 70 - EFI-RAV ZILBERSTIN_VOL 8.EFI-RAV ZILBERSTIN_VOL 8.1A
P. 70

Pg: 70 - 3-Back 21-10-31

            On the other hand, it is possible to say that when he retracted,
         the Noda B’yehudah retracted from the first principle as well, namely
         that yibum is contingent on being “without a child” at the time of
         death and he will hold that even if a son is born after his father’s
         death and the mother was not considered pregnant at the time of
         her husband’s death, the son nevertheless exempts his mother from
         chalitzah because the deceased is ultimately not lacking perpetuation
         of his name and his name is not obliterated, and the situation at the
         time of death is immaterial.

            In his chiddushim, Rav Shkop (Yevamos, 33) writes that Tosfos’s
         comments contradict the Noda B’yehudah’s first principle. The ge-
         mara in Yevamos (35b) states, “Rabbi Yochanan said, ‘The chalitzah
         of a pregnant woman is valid, because at the time of death he was
         “without a child” and she therefore requires either chalitzah or yibum.’”
         Tosfos (s.v. vehoh) ask: If so, when she did not do chalitzah and then
         gave birth to a child, she should [still] require chalitzah because at
         the moment of her husband’s death he was “without a child”? Tosfos
         answer that when the child is viable we derive from “to perpetuate
         his name” and from “his name shall not be obliterated” that a case
         where his name is not obliterated is excluded. Thus, Rabbi Yochanan
         also agrees that if the child is born viable, the mother is exempt from
         chalitzah.

            According to this the Noda B’yehudah’s first principle, namely
         that if fertilization only takes place after the husband’s death the wife
         requires chalitzah, is contradicted. According to Tosfos she is exempt
         from chalitzah because ultimately his name is not obliterated and he
         perpetuated his own name.

            So, if we assume that the Noda B’yehudah in his conclusion re-
         tracted his first principle completely because the deceased’s name is
         not obliterated, in our case too, even if the artificial insemination was
         done after his death, if it resulted in the birth of a viable child the
         mother is exempt from chalitzah for in the final analysis the name
         of the deceased is not obliterated, according to the poskim who rule
         that a child born as a result of “bathtub conception” is considered his
         father’s child.

54  1  Medical-Halachic Responsa of Rav Zilberstein
   65   66   67   68   69   70   71   72   73   74   75