Page 63 - Pep Guardiola: Another Way of Winning: The Biography

the measure of Pep and the B team, before having lunch with him to talk football. Later, Cruyff sent a
message to Laporta: ‘Pep is ready. He sees football with absolute clarity.’ The president remained
uncertain, however, believing, hoping, despite all evidence to the contrary, that Rijkaard could turn it
around and resurrect some of the old magic from Ronaldinho and Co.

As the first team’s complacency and indiscipline became apparent to all, certain directors and a
growing press contingent began to insist that there was only one man capable of restoring order at the
Camp Nou. Not Pep Guardiola, but José Mourinho. They argued that the Chelsea boss had the unique
force of personality and courage to take the necessary but painful decisions. If that meant a shift in the
club’s footballing philosophy, some argued, then so be it: drastic times, drastic measures. And, after
all, Mourinho had always dreamed of returning to Barcelona.
On 27 November 2007, Barcelona drew 2-2 with Lyons, scraping through to the knockout stage of

the Champions League in less than convincing fashion, conceding after some shambolic defending at a
set piece and giving away an unnecessary penalty. An anxious, agitated Rijkaard was sent off for the
first time in his tenure at Barcelona.
That day the football department reached a significant conclusion, deciding that Rijkaard, with a
year remaining on his contract, had to go.
Laporta continued to dither but, to be prepared, Marc Ingla (vice-president) and Txiki Beguiristain

set about drawing up a Plan B. Ingla, a successful businessman with a background in marketing,
wanted to approach the recruitment in the same way that any other major corporation would set about
hiring a senior executive: utilising a methodical and analytical selection process followed by an
interview stage, before finally making an appointment. This was a novel approach in the world of
Spanish football.
A profile of the new manager was drawn up, including a set of criteria that the candidate had to
fulfil: he should respect the footballing style inherited from Rijkaard; promote a solid work ethic and

group solidarity; supervise the work of the youth teams; place an emphasis on preparation and player
recuperation; maintain discipline in the dressing room while being respectful of all opponents and
possess a sound knowledge of the Spanish league. Furthermore, the next manager of FC Barcelona
would have to have a feel and understanding for the club, its values, significance and history.
Ingla and Beguiristain began with a long list of potential candidates. Manuel Pellegrini, Arsène
Wenger and Michael Laudrup did not survive the cut when the names they had written down were

reduced to their final preferences. They were left with a three-man short list containing the names of
the Espanyol coach and former Barcelona player Ernesto Valverde, Pep Guardiola and José
Mourinho. Valverde’s name was soon erased from the list once it became clear that too few board
members were prepared to back him. It came down to Guardiola or Mourinho.
One lacked experience, but was performing miracles with the B team and was very much a
‘Barcelona’ man; the other might not have had the club’s DNA coursing through his veins, but he
ticked just about every other box and had the support of several key board members – including

another marketing man and economic vice-president, Ferran Soriano, who said privately at the time:
‘The Mourinho brand, added to the Barça brand, has the potential to make our product enormous.’
In January 2008, Marc Ingla and Txiki Beguiristain insisted upon arranging a meeting with
Mourinho, and travelled to Portugal to interview him and his agent, Jorge Mendes, who had a good
working relationship with the club because he also represented the Barcelona pair of Deco and Rafa
Márquez.

The meeting took place in a branch of a famous Lisbon bank, a venue suggested by Mendes to
avoid any unwanted attention. Txiki’s flight was delayed and when he arrived he found Ingla had